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Chair’s foreword
There can be no doubt that Scotland requires many thousands of additional homes across all 
tenures in order to meet housing need over the coming years. With our population at a record 
high (and set to rise further) and the number of new households formed each year projected 
to increase by over 21,0001, the Scottish Government forecast that 465,000 new homes are 
necessary by 20352 to meet demand. But this is in stark contrast with new housing output 
which is now at its lowest level since 1947, having slumped by over 40% since 2007, and 
currently sitting at under 15,0003.
However, the impact of the financial crisis means that 
the capacity, finances and ability to deliver these much 
needed homes has become extremely constrained as a 
consequence of the following:
•	  Those people who would traditionally have been first 
time buyers found that they were unable to gather 
together the much higher deposits needed to obtain 
a mortgage and therefore some of them looked to the 
rented sector for somewhere to live. Others were forced 
to stay with family or friends - or simply delay their plans 
altogether.
•	  Developers found that banks simply lost their appetite 
for lending to real estate projects leading to a dramatic 
decline in housing output, which now sits at its lowest 
level since 1947. Some home building businesses, unable 
to cope with these extraordinary market conditions, 
sadly folded.
•	  Some home owners who had intended to sell their 
properties found that the market had collapsed, with 
deferring any move and renting them out becoming 
the only viable alternative- some refer to this group as 
“accidental landlords”. 
The above conditions led to the unplanned and 
unexpected rapid growth of the Private Rented Sector 
(PRS), bringing challenges as well as potential opportunities 
with respect to it becoming a professionally-managed and 
important tenure option for many. 
For some years there has been talk that large financial 
institutions were interested in investing in rented 
residential development but this has not materialised to 
any great effect. The Montague Report of September 2012 
investigated the barriers to growing the private rented 
sector, raising the issue to higher levels of awareness.
Quite clearly new thinking and new approaches are 
required in order to translate this latent interest into activity. 
Homes for Scotland (HFS) had been in discussions with 
the Scottish Government for some time as to how the 
challenges to delivery and opportunities available might be 
unlocked. This culminated in January 2013 with the Scottish 
Government and Scottish Development International (via 
Construction Scotland) jointly agreeing to sponsor HFS to 
investigate the opportunity, undertake research and, more 
importantly, if possible, drive actions to stimulate the growth 
of the sector. We are therefore grateful for their strategic 
and financial support with this project.
As a former chairman of HFS and current Board member  
I was delighted to be invited to Chair this important project.
A project steering group, which supports the core 
HFS project team, was assembled (led by HFS and 
comprising members from the Scottish Government, 
Construction Scotland, Scottish Futures Trust, Scottish 
Property Federation, Places for People and Scottish 
Widows Investment Partnership) which agreed the project 
objectives and identified the need for some expert 
research that was focused on the specific issues and 
opportunities in Scotland.
Following a tender process, the London School of 
Economics and Cambridge Centre for Housing & Planning 
Research were appointed to undertake this research. This 
report summarises their findings. 
However, I am keen to point out that this is just a stage 
in the project - an important stage because the real work 
starts now, with the implementation of the conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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The reality is that this project is about facilitating delivery of 
sustainable new build homes for the professionally managed 
rented sector, funded in an innovative way by new sources  
of institutional finance to the housing market.
I note that one of the report’s recommendations is the  
creation of a ‘Rented Sector Champion’ to take these 
suggestions forward. Given the importance and complexity  
of the task, this would seem a sensible step.
I’d like to thank all the contributors to this report and project 
steering group members for their input to date; their efforts  
and time commitments are gratefully received. 
This report has provided the steering group with an excellent 
overview of the barriers, opportunities and some ideas as to  
the possible solutions. I look forward to seeing the ‘fruits’ of  
this work and the provision of more new homes to meet our 
nation’s needs.
Gerry More
Chair of Project Steering Group, HFS Board Member 
December 2013
Source
1.  The Registrar General’s Annual Review of Demographic  
Trends 158th Edition (17 October 2013)
  http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/statistics/at-a-glance/annrev/2012/
index.html 
2.  Scottish Government press release 
 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2013/05/pension-funds 
3.  Housing Statistics for Scotland - All sector new build
  http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Housing-
Regeneration/HSfS/NewBuildAllSector 
Gerry More
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Executive summary
The opportunity
1.  There has never been a better opportunity in our 
lifetimes to develop new models of rented housing. 
These can result in long-term involvement by 
institutions in high quality, well-managed homes for 
a wide range of mobile households as well as some 
elements of family demand. Interest and enthusiasm 
is high – but we still need to see fully operational 
schemes on the ground.
2.  The objective of the project was to clarify how to help 
housebuilders increase the supply of new homes in 
the rented sector. The emphasis is on overcoming the 
barriers to expanding output, especially through new 
sources of private funding and financial models that can 
provide incremental net investment.
3.  The starting point is that investors will only bring funds 
into rental housing if the risk-adjusted return they can 
achieve is expected to be higher than that available 
elsewhere. Equally, developers must see the potential 
for profit if they are to build. Current levels of output 
are low compared to requirements so something has 
to change: demand can increase, costs may decline, or 
risks – or indeed attitudes to risk – may lessen.
Future requirements for rented housing
4.  Future demand is fundamental: demographics suggest 
that more than 20,000 households will form each year 
in Scotland and this trend will continue into the longer 
term. Since the recession, however, output has fallen – 
to around 15,000 units in 2012 – and, as yet, shows little 
sign of revival. 
5.  The very significant changes in tenure since the turn of 
the century reflect both structural and cyclical drivers. In 
the 11 years from 2001 to 2011the private rented sector 
grew from 7% to 12% of Scotland’s total stock (i.e. by 
about 135,000 units). Even if owner-occupation moves 
back towards 65% – the proportion in 2007 – Scotland 
will need at least 7,500 dwellings a year to be added to 
the rented sector. 
6.  New rented housing can be provided in the social, 
intermediate or private rented sectors. The social 
model is well understood and most innovations are 
around ways of making grant go further. Over the last 
few years the intermediate market has seen important 
developments in mid-market rental models and low-
cost homeownership, both of which meet the needs of 
those unable to afford full market rents and prices. 
7.  The big gap is in investment in the private rented sector 
– that is, homes let at market rents by private landlords 
or registered social landlords through for-profit 
subsidiaries. The majority of the increase over the last 
decade has come from existing stock rather than new 
construction, and most new investment has come from 
buy-to-let landlords. However, there is now increasing 
interest in the potential for large-scale investment on 
higher density sites managed by professional landlords 
and financed by institutions. 
Barriers to new investment in rented housing
8.  Barriers to new investment in rented housing are well-
understood in general terms. The core issues are the 
difficulty developers have in competing for land against 
owner-occupation; lack of development finance; low 
risk-adjusted yields; lack of investor experience in the 
sector together with the very limited performance data 
on which to base decisions; the need for scale; negative 
investor and local government attitudes to the sector; 
poor quality and expensive management; reputational 
risk; and uncertainties around the regulatory and 
taxation regimes. As a result, most investment occurs in 
the social and intermediate rented sectors with the help 
of government subsidy.
9.  The reasons for lack of investment can also be very 
specific. They include, in particular, investor mandates 
within financial institutions which do not include 
residential property and building specifications which 
do not meet the specific requirements of the private 
rented sector. Equally, the different stakeholders often 
speak different ‘languages’, even when talking about 
core issues such as the meaning of planning and 
development risk, determinants and interpretation of 
yield, and the implications of legislative change.
10.  The vast majority of barriers do not differ greatly 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK. Perceived 
demand is heavily concentrated in Edinburgh (as 
is true in England with respect to London) and to a 
lesser extent in Glasgow, Aberdeen and Inverness. 
UK investors who have no experience of Scotland are 
unlikely to move into that market until there is evidence 
of success. Scale is a major issue as most Scottish 
builders are relatively small. And changes in legislation, 
even when directed at improving the investment 
environment, can generate uncertainties.
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Overcoming the barriers
11.  Each of these barriers must be addressed directly. The 
solutions must clearly improve expected yields and/or 
lower perceptions of risks. Moreover, the result must 
be a coherent package; modifying individual elements 
without thought to other barriers can have perverse 
effects.
12.  The most immediate new build issue is to ensure 
that land is available where developers will wish to 
provide rented housing, probably within mixed-tenure 
developments. Most of the mechanisms being used in 
England for this purpose involve the use of public land 
and leases and ‘covenants’ to ensure long-term rental. 
In Scotland, identifying the need for private rental 
within local plans is seen as important, particularly by 
developers, as is potential exemption from S75 for 
rental developments.
13.  The lack of private finance for development is seen 
as particularly problematic. Ways forward include 
involving investors (including institutions and housing 
associations) at a much earlier stage or, as in England, 
perhaps introducing a form of market-priced but 
government-sponsored Build to Rent Fund that covers 
the development stage.
14.  There is often a mismatch between the scale of 
development and the desired scale of investment. Ways 
forward include the use of intermediaries to aggregate 
up to the required scale.
15.  Investor attitudes are affected by their lack of 
experience and expertise in the sector and the paucity 
of data available to provide the necessary empirical 
basis for decision-making. To the extent that senior 
management sees important opportunities for steady 
income growth, there is an incentive, especially for 
pension funds, to overcome this inertia. International 
investors are seen as a potential source of funds 
because of their greater experience in the sector. The 
availability of data is a chicken-and-egg problem that 
has yet to be effectively addressed.
16.  Most importantly, investors in the main are looking for 
a guaranteed income stream, at least while experience 
is being built up. The UK Government’s private rental 
guarantee applies only to debt so helps to reduce costs 
and risks but does not directly address the issue of the 
need for secure income growth.
17.  One of the most important issues for investors is the 
cost and risks associated with management – which 
determines the gap between gross and net yields. 
The very limited evidence for Scotland suggests that 
management costs are relatively high. As important 
is the lack of a professional management platform 
specifically concentrated on privately rented housing. 
Again, there are good international examples but very 
limited experience in the UK. Housing associations 
have the most relevant experience, but it is still for a 
different clientele and housing stock. Some already 
have for-profit management subsidiaries.
18.  More general risks, such as those to do with reputation 
and regulatory and policy change, are not directly 
measurable and can best be reduced by experience of 
stability and success.
Ways forward
19.  Over the last decades there has only been one 
obviously successful model of new build in the private 
rented sector where institutions have been involved: 
student housing. This worked because initially it was 
de-risked by universities and housing associations 
and provided guaranteed long-term income growth 
for institutions. It is now a successful market-based 
product.
20.  Several financial models currently being developed 
provide routes to financing rental housing. Four 
approaches where there were functional models in 
place were identified: leasing models; direct purchase 
models; aggregated bond financing models; and those 
that harness the borrowing powers of local authorities 
and housing associations.
21.  Most of these involve some form of subsidy or 
guarantee, at least initially. They are therefore most 
suited as means of expanding the provision of social 
or intermediate rental products, where there is a 
growing need for additional sub-market but low-subsidy 
provision.
22.  The UK Government is also playing a role through 
the use of the Build to Rent Fund in England and the 
UK-wide private rented sector debt guarantee scheme. 
These aim to reduce the costs and risks of finance at 
different stages of development and ownership. 
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23.  The evidence on successful models is still very 
limited, in part because the market’s interest in rented 
residential property is a recent phenomenon. What 
evidence there is suggests that there is a wide range 
of potentially successful models – from developers 
maintaining ownership and management through to 
investors becoming involved at the land-assembly 
and construction stages. Housing associations are 
often involved in these models, as initial investors 
who sell to financial institutions and/or as long-term 
managers of the stock. There is no dominant financial 
model emerging, rather a dozen flowers are potentially 
blooming.
Conclusions and recommendations 
24.  All stakeholders must be committed if the emerging 
opportunities are to be realised. These stakeholders 
include builders and developers, financial institutions, 
property management and service providers, housing 
associations, trade bodies, local government and the 
Scottish Government. All are taking an active interest, 
but most, even now, do not see developing a new 
model of renting in Scotland as a top priority. This has 
to change if the opportunities now becoming available 
are to be realised.
25.  This report’s 20 recommendations set out measures 
to overcome barriers to the development of a healthy, 
profitable sector. They call for a great deal of co-
ordination and co-operation – and for improved 
information about and understanding of what is a fast-
moving market. At the start of the project the immediate 
issue was seen to be how to attract institutional finance. 
Now many investors are showing interest. But it is not 
yet clear that the price is right – either for investors or 
for developers. There are big gaps to fill with respect to 
the availability of high quality management, the transfer 
process from developer to long-term owner and 
achieving appropriate scale. All these issues need to be 
addressed at the same time.
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Introduction
1  Introduction
1.1   Terms of reference and methods 
The main objective of this study is to provide a better 
understanding of how institutional and other investors can 
be encouraged to invest in the provision of new rental 
housing at scale in Scotland and the economic reasoning 
behind these decisions. We therefore ask both how new 
build rental homes can be brought forward, and how the 
longer term financing of ownership and management of 
rented housing can be secured. The project concentrates 
on both investment in market rent housing operated by 
purely private landlords and in either market or sub-market 
rental operated by registered social landlords (RSLs). It 
does not deal with construction of traditional social rented 
housing as this area is already well covered in the literature 
(Murja 2012). 
The research was commissioned by Homes for Scotland 
and sponsored by the Scottish Government and 
Construction Scotland. Homes for Scotland’s brief (Annex 
A) sets out several detailed research questions. We were 
asked to explore the nature of the rental investment 
product; policy models; and the specifics of investors and 
their approach to investment.
 
The methodology involved a literature review followed 
by interviews with nearly 60 stakeholders, mainly in 
Scotland and London and valuable discussions with the 
Advisory Group (led by Homes for Scotland to oversee the 
project). This allowed us to clarify the policy environment, 
the barriers to investment, the models used by different 
stakeholders and the range of possible instruments to 
support investment. In turn, this analysis has led to a set 
of recommendations to different stakeholders which, 
if followed through, could help encourage sustained 
increases in investment in rental property.
 
We are very grateful to those we interviewed for their 
helpfulness and candour. Annex B provides a breakdown 
of the number of interviewees by professional category. 
Because some of our conversations touched on 
commercially sensitive matters we have not identified 
interviewees by name or organisation. 
1.2   The problem
Since the beginning of the century the proportion of 
dwellings and households in private renting in Scotland 
has increased by a factor of nearly two. However, this 
increase has come about mainly as a result of transfers of 
dwellings from social housing, and has been funded mainly 
by individuals. There has been almost no new construction 
specifically dedicated for the rental market, apart from in 
the social sector, and virtually no investment in the rented 
sector by financial institutions. These are the main issues 
this report addresses.
Throughout this report, by ‘institutions’ we mean major 
financial organisations that pool large sums of money and 
invest them in assets. Of most interest are annuity funds, 
a segment of the pensions-fund industry, as they are 
particularly interested in long-term low-risk investments. 
1.3   The audience
This report is directed at all those who have a financial 
or policy interest in the provision of new rented housing 
in Scotland. The intended audience spans a range of 
professions and backgrounds, from politicians to local 
authority housing officers to pension fund analysts. Some 
readers may find that parts of the report set out material 
that is (to them) perfectly obvious, or feel that it unduly 
simplifies matters with which they are familiar. Our goal 
however is to provide, in a few pages, enough information 
to enable readers from all starting points to understand the 
issues from the position of other stakeholders. This has 
inevitably entailed some simplification but not, we hope, 
serious distortions. 
In this report the terms ‘market rented’ and ‘private rented’ are used 
interchangeably to describe that tenure where rents are determined on 
the open market. In the main these properties are privately owned, but it 
is increasingly common for registered social landlords to own and manage 
private rented housing through profit-making subsidiaries. 
(See the glossary for more detail on definitions.)
Building the Rented Sector in Scotland Page 11
1.4  The starting point: what determines investment 
in rented residential property?
Investment in the private rented sector at scale has not 
occurred in the UK since the 1930s, except latterly in the 
context of student accommodation and elderly care, where 
successful new investment markets have been created. 
Investment in the rental sector overall (i.e., including social 
rent) has been based mainly on the availability of public 
subsidy to support provision for low to middle-income 
households by social landlords with a mission to supply 
to this group. Since the 1970s, private funding for rented 
housing was available mainly in the form of debt finance, 
either through buy-to-let mortgages for purchase of existing 
dwellings or retail and bond finance for development of 
social and affordable housing. There is thus very little 
recent experience on which major investors can assess 
the potential for large-scale investment in rented housing 
outside the social sector, and no easily accessible indices 
with which to track the performance of such investments. 
The traditional economic analysis of how investors 
make decisions holds that rational individuals assess 
the net value of a proposed investment against that of 
other potential investments. In the context of residential 
investment, the net value is based on yield – defined 
most simply as rent divided by capital value. However this 
apparently simple decision rule hides the complexities 
behind the definition of ‘rent’, and the risks and 
uncertainties associated with the investment as compared 
to other opportunities. Thus, when an interviewee 
suggests, as some do, that investors require a yield from 
private rented investment of perhaps 5 - 7 %, this statement 
contains within it not only the basics of the calculation 
(the expected income stream, the costs associated with 
buying and letting the properties and the relevant interest 
rate for the specific investor group) but also the expected 
variance around these estimates and the value placed on 
uncertainties – such as reputational risk – which can only 
be guessed at. Professionals often use the term ‘all-risk 
yield’ to reflect this complexity. The yield requirement also 
reflects the interviewee’s estimate of the return available on 
alternative investments. 
The fact that the required yield from rented property, as 
understood by the academic and professional literature 
and interviewees, appears to have been falling over the last 
few years suggests that the fundamentals have improved 
(costs have fallen, income streams increased etc.); that 
perceived risks have declined; and/or that yields in other 
potential investment sectors have fallen. 
Understanding what determines the required yield, why it 
may have fallen over the last few years and how it might 
fall further is at the core of this report. To address these 
questions we need to understand what has happened or 
could happen to:
i)   Income streams from rented residential property (who 
the tenants are, what capacity they have to pay rent 
now and in future, and what their other housing options 
are);
ii)  Development costs;
iii) Transactions costs; 
iv) Management costs; and
v)   Returns on alternative investments (the benchmark 
interest rate depends on how the investment is 
financed and who is investing – alternative investments 
available to buy-to-let investors are very different from 
those considered by institutions.
Linked to each of these elements are risks and 
uncertainties (risks are where investors have a reasonable 
understanding of the possible variances and can calculate 
expected values; uncertainties are where at the limit they 
are guessing). Finally there is a whole range of reasons why 
actual investors (and those selling to them) do not behave 
exactly like the models predict they should– e.g., because 
of the valuation rules they are expected to use or because 
there are wider issues that decision-makers must take into 
account. In some of our discussions these are seen as the 
key barriers to investment.
Underlying these detailed factors are more basic drivers of 
demand and cost. Demand for rental housing depends not 
only on what housing is available and the rent to be paid, 
but also on opportunities in other tenures and even more 
fundamentally on demographics, incomes and people’s 
longer-term housing aspirations. Costs depend on land, 
labour market and investment opportunities elsewhere in 
the economy as well as on the efficiency of development 
and management in the rented sector. For individual 
investors and developers these more fundamental drivers 
are taken as given, but for governments both national 
and local they are core to the development of sustainable 
housing policy. 
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1.5   The UK context
Institutional investment in rented housing in the UK went 
into decline in the 1970s; the strong growth in the private 
rented sector in the last 15 years has been based on 
buy-to-let investment by individuals rather than corporate 
investment. (See Annex B for a brief historical overview.) In 
the face of growing demand for privately rented housing 
for a wider range of mainstream households, the UK 
Government set up the Montague Review (2012) to identify 
barriers to and opportunities for institutional investment 
in private renting. It has followed up with a task force to 
address barriers on the ground, and with subsidies and 
guarantees to improve returns. 
In the past decade the situation has begun to change, and 
market fundamentals are now stronger than they have 
been since before 1939. All the elements that affect the 
yield required for rented housing to compete against other 
opportunities have seen improvements. There has been 
rapid growth in the PRS across Britain and demand is high, 
especially in pressured urban areas (see Halifax, 2013) – so 
income streams for landlords are stronger and less risky, 
even though most households ultimately want to own their 
own homes. There is considerable potential for large-scale 
developments on regeneration sites, and mixed-community 
developments are popular especially in London –so there 
are more investment opportunities. There is a great deal 
of enthusiasm among stakeholders, including from major 
investors, especially annuity funds, who see that residential 
investment could provide a long-term income stream with 
growth potential that would match their long-term liabilities. 
There are at least three important missing elements: 
experience of successful schemes, a pipeline of larger 
developments suitable for residential rental development 
and data that would allow decision makers to determine 
acceptable overall returns and on-going performance. 
There is also a question as to whether the momentum will 
be lost as the economy recovers and owner-occupation 
picks up.
1.5.1    Large-scale investments in the private  
rented sector in England 
There are currently very few institutional investments in 
large-scale rented housing. Most of them are in London. 
They include Stratford Halo (where Genesis, a housing 
association, sold part of the development on a 160-year 
lease to Prudential with an associated management 
contract and a guaranteed income stream to the investor) 
and East Village (the private part of the Olympic Village, 
bought by Qatari Diar Delancey, where a very large number 
of units will become available simultaneously and there is a 
clear exit strategy). There are growing numbers of private 
rented developments led by registered providers (RPs), 
some of which may be transferred to institutional investors 
who will receive payments from the rental streams (e.g., 
Fizzy Living, part of the Thames Valley Housing Association 
group). The housing associations will continue to provide 
management services, which helps them to manage 
exposure /cost of voids for the guaranteed amounts, 
particularly in areas of high demand. 
There are also a small number of examples of ‘covenanted’ 
private rental developments in England where the local 
authority owns the land and requires that the properties 
be rented for a specified number of years. The first tranche 
of the UK Government’s Build to Rent Fund is in play 
(in England only), with 45 organisations (both housing 
associations and private developers) sharing a pot of £700 
million. Many more projects are being talked about and are 
in process. 
However, there are continuing concerns about risks and 
returns and particularly about whether there is a pipeline 
of sites in suitable areas across the UK. Investor appetite is 
partly driven by ready supply and a significant market (for 
both entry and exit purposes) – at present neither condition 
is fully met but many institutions now expect to have rented 
housing as part of their investment portfolio over the 
medium to long term. 
This brief examination of the increasing interest in longer 
term investment in rental housing in the UK (but mainly 
in England) points to some areas to be explored in the 
Scottish context:
•	  First, is there a need for additional investment in the 
rented sector in Scotland?
•	  Second, what is the potential for institutional investment 
in large-scale developments in high-demand areas? 
•	  Third, do housing associations or local authorities have 
a potential role in developing and/or managing homes in 
the wider rental market?
•	  Fourth, can the use of public land and contractual 
arrangements or covenants on developers or investors 
help ensure both viability and that the housing remains 
in private rental?
•	  Fifth, are there enough available and suitable sites 
available for rented housing? 
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1.6   The Scottish context
Table 1 provides an overview of the basic statistics on 
households, the housing stock and new investment for 
Scotland. It shows that the number of households has 
grown annually by an average of 18,000 over the period 
2001 to 2011, and that while housing completions were 
keeping pace with household growth in 2001, by 2011 
they were running well below that level. It also shows that 
while traditionally Scotland has had a strong commitment 
to social rental, the tenure has been in decline over the 
decade, partly due to the Right to Buy policy, while private 
renting has grown particularly rapidly. 
See Table 1: Statistics about the Scottish housing market 
below.
Table 2 provides more detail on how the ownership of 
housing stock changed over the decade 2001 to 2011. 
It shows that the private rented stock grew by 135,000 
units, only 7,000 units less than the numerical growth in 
owner-occupation (143,000). On the other hand, the stock 
of social housing-especially that owned by local authorities- 
fell rapidly, particularly in the early years. Over the same 
period owner occupation grew (to 65% in 2007) and then 
fell in proportional terms - though not in absolute numbers. 
The rate of growth in private renting increased after the 
financial crisis. 
What is also important is that during this period, new 
completions of social and affordable housing were 
maintained (Scottish Government Communities ASD 
Housing Statistics). In the six years between 2007 and 
2013, some 30,000 units were completed for social 
renting but the outflow to other tenures more than offset 
this investment. Equally some 9,000 units were added 
to affordable home ownership, meaning that mainstream 
owner-occupation actually declined in the period  
after 2007. 
See Table 2: Scottish dwelling stock by tenure:  
2001 to 2011 below.
Item 2001 2011 Comments
Households 2.20m 2.38m Projected to rise to 2.59 million and to 2.89 million by 2035 (an average of over 20,000 per annum)
Housing stock total 2.31m 2.50m Construction kept up with growth in household numbers
Owner-occupation 63% 64% Growth in number of owner-occupiers but not now in proportion – see table 2
Private renting 7% 12% Increase of 130,000 units over decade
Social renting 30% 24% Decline of 96,000 units over the decade 
Housing completions 22,400 15,190 Peak in completions 25,740 in 2007; number still falling in 2012
Private 81% 65%
Social 19% 35%
Proportion of completions 
in Edinburgh, Glasgow and 
Aberdeen
29% 20% The number of households in the three cities is 29% of total households
of which private 69% 50% In 2011 % private ranged from 85% in Aberdeen to only 34% in Glasgow
Average house price £76,000 £171,000
ONS price index 100 225 Shows consistent increases over decade
Nationwide index 100 211 Shows fall in 2009 and still not back to 2009 levels
Year Owner-occupation
Private 
renting
Social 
landlords
Of which owned by
Housing 
associations
Local authorities Total Increase per annum
2001 1452 (63%) 170 (7%) 692 (30%) 139 (6%) 553 (24%) 2314
2007 1590 (65%) 233 (10%) 607 (25%) 261 (11%) 346 (14%) 2430 01-07: 9,300
2011 1595 (64%) 305 (12%) 595 (24%) 275 (11%) 320 (13%) 2495 07-11: 6,250
Change 2001-1 +143 (+10%) +135 (+80%) -97 (-14%) +136 (98%) -233 (-42%) +181 (+8%) 01-11: 8,100
Sources: National Records for Scotland; Scottish Government Housing Trends; ONS; Scottish Government Communities Analytic Services, Nationwide BS
Source: DCLG Live table 107: Scottish Government
Table 1
Table 2
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These figures suggest that both cyclical and structural 
factors have worked together to change tenure patterns. 
The rise in private renting, especially among younger 
households, starts well before the financial crisis and may 
go back to the early 1990s. But equally, many households 
and dwellings currently in the private rented sector would 
move to owner-occupation if incomes rose and credit 
become easier. Returning to a 2007 tenure split (which is 
roughly the EU average) would imply that there would be 
some 30,000 more owner-occupiers and perhaps 11% of 
dwellings in private renting. 
The Scottish Government has set out a vision for a private 
rented sector ‘that provides good quality homes and high 
management standards, inspires consumer confidence, 
and encourages growth through attracting increased 
investment’ (Scottish Government, 2013). As the document 
notes, ‘there has been growth in the number of younger 
people, including those with families, calling the PRS their 
home.’
Finally, both population and household numbers are set 
to grow more rapidly in the next decade than in the last 
– so there is a need for additional housing in all sectors. 
However, the market for new build homes in Scotland is 
showing few signs of recovery, with housing completions 
continuing to fall and running at below 60% of the peak 
level of over 25,500 in 2007 (Table 1). This is highly 
undesirable, particularly as the number of households 
continues to grow and house prices have more than 
doubled since 2000. Barriers to expanding overall 
investment include continuing shortages of mortgage credit 
as well as a lack of confidence in both the employment and 
housing markets. Development finance is currently difficult 
to obtain on reasonable terms and many developers are 
choosing to be self-financing, which limits activity levels. Yet 
land and capacity are available, as are a number of large 
regeneration sites. 
To meet the projected growth in households of over 
20,000 per annum, and to mop up some of the backlog, 
suggests that output levels will need to return to those 
achieved in the mid-2000s. If structural factors mean that 
owner-occupation only returns to 2007 proportions this 
would entail a contribution from the rental sector (including 
social, intermediate and market rented housing) of 7,500 – 
8,000 units. This level of investment will be far more easily 
achieved if a healthy long- term private rented sector can 
be created. 
1.7   The current position
The historical evidence suggests that the requirements for 
healthy growth in investment in new rented housing are:
•	  strong demand from working tenants, many renting for 
the long term; 
•	  easy access to suitable development sites in the right 
locations; 
•	  reasonable certainty about securing planning 
permission; 
•	 clear contractual arrangements and no rent controls; 
•	 adequate finance; and
•	 a supportive policy environment.
 
There are many indications that now is the right time for 
governments to be considering institutional investment 
in rented housing again. Both the UK and Scottish 
governments have increasingly recognised that market 
and intermediate renting are important parts of overall 
housing provision. They recognise their role in catering 
both for market demand and for households on benefits 
(although institutional investors are less likely to focus on 
this part of the market). As importantly, both governments 
have recognised that all parts of the housing market need 
to contribute to overall provision, such that there is choice 
and availability. 
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2 Barriers to investment in rented housing 
The question of how to attract institutional investment 
into the rented sector in general, and private renting 
in particular, is one that has attracted the attention of 
academic experts and policy-makers for several years. 
Some other countries —particularly Germany and the USA 
— are perceived to have better-operating sectors, which is 
ascribed in part to the role that institutional investors play 
in those markets (although in fact in both countries, as in 
the UK, small ‘amateur’ landlords own most rented property 
[Scanlon and Kochan 2011]). In the UK, on the other hand, 
institutions and property companies were important actors 
up to the 1960s but then withdrew almost entirely, usually 
by selling properties into owner-occupation (Hamnett and 
Randolph, 1988).
Table 3 lists the most important barriers to institutional 
investment in the rented sector, according to our interviews 
and to recent reports by policy and academic experts 
(Crook and Kemp, 2011). We have treated them in five 
categories:
•	  Those to do with new construction, especially  
that for the rented sector
•	  Those to do with institutional investors and their decision-
making processes
•	 Those around the return on private rented property
•	 Those to do with risk, and
•	 Scotland-specific issues.
a. Land and construction
General issue Specifics Important to developers/investors?
1 Value of land driven by 
owner-occupation 
Developers who want to build for rent cannot outbid those building for owner occupation Developers
2 Supply of land There is not enough developable land in locations that would work for rental housing 
Planning controls 
Requirement for public bodies to obtain best value for land sales
Local authorities unwilling to lose commercial/industrial land to housing
Lack of an adequate pipeline of development land with full planning  
permission in attractive areas
Interest in separate use class for private rented housing but no consensus  
about whether a good idea
More relevant to developers than investors
3 Local authority policies Local authorities’ position on S75 contributions, which affects viability 
General attitude to private renting 
Private rented housing not sufficiently covered in local housing needs assessments
Local authorities steer developers towards particular sites that may not  
be suitable for private rented housing 
Lower value of rental developments implies foregoing affordable housing and other 
infrastructure (e.g. schools) provided through S75
Proposal that PRS development be treated as affordable housing
More relevant to developers than investors
4 Lack of development 
finance
Banks will not lend to developers, or do so on onerous terms
Some developers self-funding, even if they could access bank finance, because of terms
Some have long-term arrangements, especially large developers and housing associations
More relevant to developers than investors
b. Investor attitudes
General issue Specifics Important to developers/investors?
5 Investor unwillingness to take 
planning/development risk
Would enable higher returns but does not fit investment style of  
many long-term investors
More relevant to developers than investors
6 Investors’ mandates (industry 
benchmarks)
Pension funds in particular required to track industry indices, and  
residential property is not included in them
Yes to some
7 Illiquidity of residential 
property
Residential property transactions can be long and costly; relevant  
to exit strategies if these involve sales
Depends on investor
8 Lack of robust market 
information
Rent indices and detailed evidence on costs and performance underdeveloped  
compared to commercial/office property
Possibly important to investors
9 Management Investors do not know if they can accurately assess gross-to-net reduction
Some investors want arm’s-length management platform; others prefer to manage 
in-house
Yes
10 Lack of expertise within 
investment houses
Chicken and egg: no expertise as few investments; few investments as no expertise Beginning to be recognised
11 Scale of potential investment Institutional investors want transactions worth at least £10m and  
preferably £50m, and current rental developments are too small
Yes
Table 3: Barriers to the development and ownership of private rental housing 
Barriers to investment 
in rented housing
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c. Yield vs. commercial property and other investments
General issue Specifics Important to developers/investors?
12 Predictability of demand 
into the longer term
The rise in PRS over the last few years has been large but unclear what proportion  
is cyclical and what structural 
Yes
13 Location In appropriate locations units will rent more quickly, attract higher rents and  
experience fewer voids 
PRS at market rents only works in higher-pressure areas, and specific locations
Regeneration sites may offer opportunities but have higher risks
Views differ
14 Product features It may be difficult to let large developments rapidly and maintain low vacancy  
rates if units become available at the same time
Yes – tend to want to purchase  
after first letting
15 Taxation Efficient management reduces gross-to-net margin by reducing direct costs and turnover 
Good management reduces reputational risk, e.g. by reducing evictions and dealing with 
problem tenants effectively
Inadequate benchmarking of individual costs
Yes
16 Product features Units specifically designed for renting may be cheaper to manage
Eventual managers (e.g. RSLs) want role in specifying units
Issues around optimum site scale and tenure mix; flats vs. houses
Yes to long-term investors
17 Taxation SDLT and VAT on management fees reduce yields compared to commercial property Yes - affects yields and exit strategy
18 Price Mechanisms for including future rent increases in valuation not well developed; rules as 
they are employed are often not comparable to share valuation re capital gains 
What is appropriate discount for bulk sale to investor?
Yes
19 Reputational risks Still seen as important issue at investor board level – both with respect to own investment 
and the reputation of the sector
Local experience associates PRS with criminality/ASB
Yes
20 Regulatory and policy 
risks
Potential investors wary of imposition of rent controls, security of tenure and/or longer 
leases in Scotland
Concerns about the relative position of private renting to other government initiatives  
and the possibility of crowding out
Yes
d. Scotland-specific issuess
General issue Specifics Important to developers/investors?
21 Specific knowledge of the 
Scottish environment
Those not already involved in Scotland have little understanding of opportunities Yes
22 Independence vote Uncertainty means investment decisions deferred at least until after vote To some but not all 
23 20-year lease and 
standard security rules
Housing (Scotland ) Act 2010 exempts social landlords and rural housing bodies from 
the lease rules and allows them to opt out of the standard security restrictions; the 2011 
Housing Act allows for other bodies to be designated as exempt
Some investors unclear of implications 
24 Regulatory and  
policy risks
Uncertainties about possible imposition of rent control, security of tenure  
and/or longer leases
Yes as part of general concern  
about the sector 
Building the Rented Sector in Scotland Page 17
2.1   Barriers to new construction
The first part of Table 3 deals with barriers to new 
construction. The main thrust of both the interviews and 
the literature is that there simply is not enough new supply 
of rental housing or new housing in general. The reasons 
include lack of adequate land supply in the right areas, 
the application of planning controls, and differences 
of views between developers and local authorities as 
to the economics of private renting and its locational 
requirements.
In terms of land supply, the problem is not seen to be an 
absolute shortage of building land, but rather a lack of 
land in the high-demand areas that could sustain rental 
developments. Even where land is available it is often 
difficult for rental developers to acquire it, since they must 
bid for land against those who are building for owner-
occupation. In many circumstances owner-occupation, 
and indeed buy-to-let, will generate a higher capital 
value for the properties (e.g. because the prices include 
expectations of future capital gains) and therefore a 
higher land value. (See Annex D for a discussion of the 
calculation of development land value.) Circumstances 
where this might not be the case include large sites where 
the build-out rate can be much higher for rental properties 
and certain types of flatted accommodation which can be 
managed more cost effectively as rented housing. Even 
in these circumstances, developers will normally wish to 
sell certain parts of a development (e.g., the last phase 
or penthouses) into owner-occupation. In lower demand 
areas where capital gains are not expected but rents may 
increase with incomes, rental values can be higher than 
owner-occupied prices -but in these circumstances it is 
likely that there will be other barriers to development. 
Another barrier can be the requirements under S75 of the 
Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997, which 
allows local authorities to seek planning obligations or 
contributions on developers (e.g. a proportion of affordable 
units in a new housing development or a contribution to 
new schools). These are calculated on the basis of the 
value of the proposed use. Compared to sale into owner-
occupation, a (mainly) rental development will normally 
offer a lower margin for the developer from which to offer 
S75 contributions. 
Local authorities that relax S75 requirements for this reason 
need to show that they meet defined housing needs – 
which may be difficult since most local authority Housing 
Need and Demand Assessments do not break out the 
demand for private rented housing within the market sector. 
Even if the local authority agreed to relax S75 requirements 
on this basis it is likely to want to ensure that units would 
remain in the rented sector rather than being sold into 
owner-occupation. Similar issues arise with respect to the 
valuation of public land at highest and best use. 
The decline in the rate of new construction in the wake 
of the financial crisis stems not only from uncertainties 
with respect to demand and issues around planning 
and land supply, but also from developers’ problems in 
accessing finance. Banks have tightened lending criteria 
significantly and are now much less willing to fund 
speculative development; this has particularly affected 
small residential developers but has also had an impact 
on major firms. Many developers appear to be mainly self-
financing which limits their potential level of activity and 
this has opened the way for investors to move directly into 
the development market. Moreover, in current conditions, 
it is easier for developers to build houses than flats, as it 
reduces the amount of capital they have tied up. This is 
an issue for the rented sector because large apartment 
buildings are a more cost-efficient way of providing rented 
accommodation—and attractive to the types of household 
that form the core demand for private renting.
Although banks are unwilling to fund speculative 
development, they will still fund construction if a suitable 
third party has committed to buy the completed units; this 
is the mechanism employed, for example, by the National 
Housing Trust initiative which has operated in Scotland 
for some years (see Annex E). The inclusion of affordable 
housing in the development, which generates early 
payments, can also be helpful.
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2.2   Investor attitudes
In the UK, institutions and property companies were 
historically involved in the PRS, but generally disinvested 
in the second half of the 20th century and now have 
limited expertise in the sector. The market for investment 
in commercial property, on the other hand, is mature and 
institutional investors are active and well-resourced in this 
market, which they understand well. Commercial property 
is normally sold to investors once it is completed and let 
on fully repairing and insuring leases of 10 or 15 years with 
a 10-year break. The leases have regular upward-only 
rent reviews and the capital value of the asset falls over 
time, unlike residential. Ideally potential investors want a 
‘perfect’ product with certain rental growth and controlled 
costs. The challenge therefore is to make residential 
perform in somewhat of the same way - or change investor 
perceptions and expectations.
Table 3b sets out the issues that affect institutions’ attitudes 
towards investing in the rented sector. Certain elements 
of their worldview inform how they see this type of 
investment. In particular, institutional investors (especially 
annuity funds) are looking for predictable long-term income 
streams that will be a good match for their liabilities. 
Despite some counter-examples, most institutional 
investors wish to purchase either on completion or after 
first letting – although they (or their designated managers) 
may well want a say in the specification of the properties. 
Their time horizon would be decades, increasing the 
benefits of a certain income stream - although many 
investors still want a clear potential exit strategy. This 
suggests that a new business and financial model needs to 
emerge alongside ‘build to sell’ or ‘build to own and let at 
social or affordable rents’.
Within institutions there are information and internal 
structural issues about how the market operates that 
may deter investment. Pension funds are often advised 
by their consultants or actuaries to follow investment 
strategies designed to track particular market benchmarks. 
Institutionally funded residential property for private rent, as 
a nascent market segment, does not appear in any of the 
widely used property benchmarks, and some interviewees 
said that until it does there will be little institutional interest 
- and as a corollary, little institutional expertise. A more 
general issue lies around detailed evidence of costs, rents 
and yields. IPD is the only source of such information 
that is recognised by investors, in part because they 
have provided that service for retail, office and industrial 
properties for decades. Their residential index is much 
younger and has relatively limited coverage and, while 
nationwide, is heavily concentrated in London. Information 
on Scotland is almost entirely limited to Edinburgh.
Some interviewees disputed the importance of indices, 
saying that investment managers should try to beat rather 
than track them, and that they should be willing to place at 
least a small portion of their money in non-benchmarked 
assets. There is evidence that a few financial institutions 
have adopted this attitude, but so far their initiatives appear 
to depend on a small number of individuals in a position to 
modify internal rules. Gradually others may ‘dip their toes in 
the water’.
A further issue for institutions is that they generally do 
not want to manage rented housing themselves, but want 
‘platform-level investments’—that is, rental businesses 
that are already up and running. Management needs to 
be competent so the investor is not associated with bad 
publicity (reputational risk was seen as a very important 
issue) and efficient so as to minimise the gross-to-net 
reduction (the difference between total rent received and 
net income after costs—see Annex D). Benchmarking 
is important – and concerning: while the most efficient 
managers claim management costs account for about 
20% of gross income (the gross-to-net reduction), the IPD 
average gross-to-net reduction is 35% for the UK overall 
and 47% in Scotland (IPD Communication). Again there is 
a major problem of expertise, as there are relatively few 
managers of large-scale housing outside the housing 
association and local authority landlord sector, and the 
majority of the residential letting sector is either self-
managed or managed by local estate agents.
Not all new build rented properties are equally attractive to 
large investors. Major investors are looking for transactions 
worth £10 million minimum, and preferably much more 
- £50 million seems to be the benchmark. They do not 
want to assemble these portfolios themselves but will 
purchase existing portfolios of sizeable residential blocks 
or, occasionally, of scattered units. 
In the past, these barriers have together been seen 
as insurmountable. This is now changing and there is 
increasing investor interest in the sector. In Edinburgh, 
investment in private rental stock is already happening 
across the city at both small and large scale. A recent deal 
saw Hearthstone Investments acquire two blocks at the 
Miller Homes developments at Varcity North and Varcity 
South, close to the city centre. The units will be let and 
held as investments. A recent presentation in London by 
the Resolution Foundation of their model for attracting 
institutional investment to rented housing attracted a 
large audience including many senior people from the 
investment industry. A number of transactions have already 
taken place as UK and overseas institutions trade, build 
portfolios of existing units or take part in new schemes. The 
current environment is undoubtedly the most positive in 
living memory. 
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2.3   Yields
For all the interest currently being shown, the main barrier 
to investment remains that rented housing is seen to 
produce inadequate yields in comparison to commercial 
property or other alternative investments. Table 3c lists the 
main factors mentioned by interviewees.
In part this is because of the different ways yields and 
development or residual valuations are defined. If future 
rent increases and potential capital gains are not included 
in that calculation, then the yield threshold depends on 
how residential property is categorised in terms of risk, and 
how the broader-based risks discussed in Annex D are 
evaluated. What is clear from interviews is that acceptable 
initial yields are falling and are now in a range starting from 
significantly below 5% when rental returns are guaranteed 
to as much as 8% (although it is by no means obvious 
exactly what these numbers include). 
Location has been included amongst the factors that affect 
yield—although it could equally have been listed under 
investor attitudes. Location should not matter as long as the 
yield is right – however the yield required will be different 
in different individual markets, because the perceived risks 
differ. In practice institutions providing funds for developers 
‘are likely to be very selective in terms of the property 
developers that they lend to and the location and nature 
of the schemes’ (Isaac, O’Leary & Daley 2010, p.145). Our 
discussions also suggested that while some annuity funds 
are already looking to Scotland, there are major investors 
who are more comfortable investing only in London and 
the southeast than elsewhere in the UK – especially if 
discussing new build.
The core element affecting perceived risk is demand. 
Demand has risen rapidly across all parts of the rental 
sector in Scotland as in the rest of Britain, although 
growth has been concentrated in the market and, to 
a lesser extent, intermediate sectors. There are both 
cyclical and structural reasons for these changes and it 
is currently difficult to be certain about the equilibrium 
number and make-up of households who will live in the 
market sector. This uncertainty is currently reflected in 
falling rents in some parts of Britain even though they are 
clearly continuing to rise in more pressured areas. UK 
and Scottish Government policies that support owner-
occupation, notably Help to Buy, may also reduce demand 
if maintained. 
The efficiency of management has a direct effect on 
costs and thus on yields. Amongst interviewees there 
were differing views about the optimum scale of holding 
in management terms; one interviewee said a landlord 
needed 400+ units in one place, another 150; at the other 
end of the scale we were told that at least 10 units in one 
street were sufficient to drive efficiencies. 
Several interviewees said that large-scale developments 
on single sites would have lower management costs than 
portfolios assembled from units across several sites, and 
that therefore these should be preferred.
Costs are affected by the physical characteristics of the 
rented dwellings. There was a range of views about 
whether rented housing should ideally differ physically 
from owner-occupied housing, and if so how. Many of the 
existing financial models for rented-sector investment are 
based on an exit strategy of selling the units into owner-
occupation after a time, in which case radically different 
physical products are probably not an option—although it 
was seen as important to have something robust that would 
still have kerb appeal after 10 years in the rental market. 
The main elements that might be different in rental-specific 
housing related to (a) provision for households consisting 
of adult sharers and (b) minimising repair and maintenance 
costs for the landlord. They included:
•	  Equal bedroom sizes, rather than one master bedroom 
and one or two smaller ones 
•	 En-suites to all bedrooms
•	  nstallation of goods lifts in blocks of flats, so passenger 
lifts or staircases did not get damaged by the movement 
in and out of furniture and belongings
•	 Better-quality kitchens for durability
•	 Fitness clubs or other communal facilities
•	  Standardisation of e.g. boilers so a single maintenance 
team could service them all; good access to heating and 
plumbing
•	 Wide corridors and doors
The property managers we spoke to – most of them 
housing associations - said that if they were to manage 
private rented housing they would want to be involved from 
the outset so they could influence design and specification. 
This of course would be subject to construction 
procurement rules.
Costs are also affected by turnover. The six-month to one-
year Short Assured Tenancy which dominates the private 
rented sector in Scotland does not mean that people 
actually move on at the end of the initial contract. The 
evidence is that average length of stay has been increasing 
and is now between two and three years. However, 
longer leases for unfurnished property may be one way of 
reducing turnover and enabling people better to see their 
rented unit as home (again reducing costs). 
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Taxation also affects costs and yield. The Land and 
Buildings Transaction Tax (2013) provides enabling 
legislation, but there are concerns that the transactions 
costs for the sale of large numbers of units will be high, 
even though a bulk purchase rate is envisaged. It can also 
be attractive for investors to buy the land rather than the 
completed development as they then only pay stamp duty 
on the former. Another tax issue is VAT on management 
fees; this cannot be recovered on residential (unlike 
commercial).
 
Apart from rents and costs, the other determinant of yield is 
initial price. Many of the potential investors we interviewed 
said that residential property was too expensive in the UK 
overall, and in London but also in Edinburgh in particular. 
Therefore yields are seen as too low and risks of capital 
losses too high. 
 
Capital values are normally provided by valuers using 
evidence from capital transactions. Valuers normally 
value residential property assets on the basis of owner-
occupation and single sales because that is what lenders 
instruct. The resulting asset values result in low yields. An 
alternative, often used by housing associations, is to value 
properties on the basis of discounted cash flow as for 
commercial property—this emphasises rental streams and 
is the approach that many investors understand (see Hill 
2006). A Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors working 
group in England has been looking at the principles of 
valuing covenanted private renting because of the lack of 
experience in living memory of valuing long-term rented 
residential assets. One suggestion is that rents should be 
uplifted by CPI – however the most likely impact of such a 
change on decisions would be to modify the comparator 
that takes account of perceived increases in risk. 
Interviewees involved in developing rental property felt that 
annuity funds should view investment in rented housing 
as a long-term commitment that would produce a utility-
type income stream, and look for net yields of around 4% 
net. There was little evidence however that pension fund 
managers shared this view; required income-only yields 
seemed to be from 4.75% and (a long way) up.
In principle, a developer might be prepared to sell 
portfolios of rental units for less than identical owner-
occupation units because they would not have to pay 
the cost of marketing, would benefit from efficiencies on 
build costs, and could accept a lower profit margin if the 
development was pre-sold. Amongst our interviewees, 
developers seemed to think a discount of 5% for these 
reasons was about right, while non-developers saw 10-15% 
as desirable. 
There are a range of issues where it is not possible to 
quantify the impact on yield or the choice of comparator. 
There are important areas of perception and attitudes 
that can carry more weight than formal yield calculations. 
These include fears that the organisation’s and sector’s 
reputation may be damaged; difficulties in achieving first 
and subsequent lets that are consistent with expectations 
with respect to turnover and quality of tenants; and policy 
risks which centre mainly on fears that there will be sudden 
changes in regulatory regimes. 
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2.4   Scotland-specific issues 
Table 3d sets out a number of issues specific to Scotland. 
The core question relates to yields: where in Scotland 
would rented housing produce the kinds of yield that 
investors require? The general view expressed by both 
developers and investors was that it would work easily only 
in a few areas, including Edinburgh, some parts of Glasgow, 
Aberdeen, Inverness and maybe St Andrews. This is more 
because demand has been observed to grow in these 
areas than because there has been detailed analyses. 
On the other hand, other interviewees suggested that 
particularly in Edinburgh, rental yields and capital values 
were wildly out of alignment, and that rents would have to 
rise or values fall to bring yields to a level where the return 
would be acceptable to an institution. 
Most interviewees outside Scotland had not thought of 
Scotland as a place in which to invest any more than most 
had thought of looking far outside London for new market 
rental provision. The position was different for those 
already investing in Scotland and especially those for 
whom Scotland was the main focus of their activity.
There was a strong view among some of the interviewees 
– both in England and Scotland, and across all professional 
groups—that investors would defer decisions until the 
independence question was settled. Institutions that had no 
office in Scotland and no existing exposure to the rented 
sector were unlikely to commit in the face of an uncertain 
political situation. Others however said it would make no 
difference. In any case it was recognised that this was a 
short-term question that would be determined one way or 
another within less than a year. 
The final detailed issue identified were the so-called 20-
Year Lease and Standard Security Rules . The changes 
brought in under the 2010 and 2011 Housing Acts, which 
created exemptions for social landlords and rural housing 
bodies, plus opportunities for similar exemption for private-
sector bodies through a different route. However some 
investors saw this as a continuing problem.
More general issues related to perceived uncertainties 
around taxation and regulation. These are dealt with in 
section 3 below.
See http://www.scotland.gov.uk/
Publications/2010/03/04140613/8 
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3  Ways forward: overcoming barriers to  
  development and investment 
Table 4 sets out the most important suggestions made in 
the research literature and interviews on how to address 
the range of identified barriers found in the literature and in 
interviews into three groups: those to do with development; 
those affecting institutional attitudes to investing in private 
renting; and those affecting yields and the risks affecting 
the required yield. There are also some Scotland-specific 
issues.
3.1   Solutions to development and funding barriers
Overcoming development barriers requires financially 
viable projects which can compete for land against owner-
occupation and sometimes commercial projects; buildings 
and units that meet the needs of owners, managers 
and tenants; and reasonable financial opportunities. 
Here we concentrate on three core suggestions: tying 
development into private renting for long periods; public/
private partnership approaches to the use of public land; 
generating scale; and forward funding.
3.1.1 Requiring new housing to be rented for long periods 
With respect to tying sites into private renting, the 
apparently most straightforward approach favoured by 
some commentators is a new use class for private renting. 
There are obvious difficulties with such an approach where 
it is introduced simply to cut land values. It would be likely 
to result in land being withheld in the hope of change; 
it goes against the fundamentals of tenure neutrality 
embedded in the planning system; it is inflexible in the 
face of changing circumstances and the need for mixed-
tenure development; and it cuts off potential exit strategies 
for developers and owners, thus increasing risk. This is 
particularly the case if there are problems with the early 
period of initial lettings - since initial investors may need 
flexibility to exit through sale if needed. Countries with this 
style of approach (such as Denmark, Sweden and the USA) 
have seen private rented new development dry up and 
developed new ways (such as condominiums) for enabling 
transfer as circumstances change. The result in all cases 
has been a smaller private rented sector. 
A system which goes more readily with the grain of current 
UK (although perhaps not with Scottish) legislation is 
where a separate contract requires that all or (more likely) 
a proportion of the units in a development be let for a 
number of years. One way forward, currently being trialled 
in England, is what is being called ‘covenanted private 
renting’. Here the public sector land owner, when leasing 
their land to a developer or other organisation, imposes a 
requirement that the units be kept in the rented sector for 
a period of time (perhaps 30 years, although usually with 
some potential for review if circumstances change). One 
impact is to reduce the value of the land and so satisfy 
the district valuer’s requirement that highest and best use 
is being achieved. The other is to enable rental-specific 
developments which can have lower running costs and 
a larger demand. It can act as a substitute for planning 
obligations which currently only enable affordable housing. 
There have as yet only been a few examples, all on publicly 
owned land in London and the South East. They include 
the Olympic Park, Kensington and Chelsea, and North 
Hampshire. In all three cases they depend upon the public 
ownership of the land and thus the power to contract/
impose such restrictions. In many ways this is an alternative 
to S75, and can be used where the land owner is prepared 
to take the hit on price directly to achieve the aim of 
meeting housing need.
In the context of using planning gain to support rental 
housing, a few interviewees suggested that planners 
could treat new rental developments as if they were 
affordable housing, which would obviate the need for 
S75 for affordable housing entirely. The current planning 
guidance is ambiguous about whether this might be 
permissible in some cases. It says ‘Affordable housing is 
defined in the Scottish Planning Policy as housing of a 
reasonable quality that is affordable to people on modest 
incomes. In some places the market provides some or all 
of the affordable housing needed….’ (Scottish Government 
2010 p. 2) However the examples given of affordable 
private rented housing do not include market housing; the 
guidance lists ‘Mid-market or intermediate rented: Private 
rented accommodation available at rents below market rent 
levels in the area and which may be provided either over 
the medium or long term’ (ibid). This suggests that treating 
new rental developments as affordable housing would 
probably not be possible, at least in those areas where 
such developments would be most obviously economically 
viable.
Another approach would be to use a modified S75 to 
achieve similar aims. However, the Scottish Government 
view was that using S75 to require market-rent 
accommodation would be extremely hard to justify (see 
discussion on page 14). 
Ways forward: 
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General issue Possible ways to address Who can do it?
About development and finance
1 Value of land driven by owner-
occupation
Create a new use class for private renting Government
2 Supply of land / planning 
controls
LAs identify and/or designate land specifically for rented housing
Make use of flexibilities in planning system: reducing requirement for  
S75 contributions for rented housing 
Use S75 to impose covenants on rented stock
Allocation of public sector land
Public bodies accept deferred payment on land, joint ventures
Government to experiment with a wider definition of ‘value for money’  
in public land sales
Government
3 Information gaps within local 
authorities
Include private rented housing in local housing strategies Government
4 Lack of development finance Build to Rent fund Government
5 Existence of opportunities at 
suitable scale
Build to Rent fund
Aggregate units on various sites
Government, private sector
About investor attitudes
6 Investor unwillingness to take 
planning/ development risk
Evidence of successful involvement of all parties from early stages Individual institutional investors and 
developers
7 Investors’ mandates (industry 
benchmarks)
Get residential into the property benchmark Private sector: involve Scottish Financial 
Enterprise (SFE) 
8 Illiquidity of residential property Identify exit strategies more transparently and ensure all-risk yields clearly take into 
account.
Valuers and institutions including SFE
9 Lack of robust market 
information
Produce better information Support IPD in strengthening residential 
index. involve SFE
10 Management Involve RSLs as managers Private sector, RSLs
11 Valuation rules Change the basis for valuation Private sector
12 Lack of expertise within 
investment houses
Creation of expert task force Government
About yield
13 Management Involve RSLs, and potentially other social landlords, as managers Private sector, RSLs, local authorities
14 Product features Early involvement by managers to minimise long-term costs Developers, institutions and managers 
15 Location Make large-scale sites in accessible locations available for residential development Local authorities
16 Taxation Change rules re VAT/transaction taxes Government
Other barriers
17 Management Higher quality management All stakeholders 
18 Regulatory and policy risk Clear and certain policy direction Government
19 Income and nature of demand Guarantee rental income 
Longer-term leases
Government, RSLs, private sector
20 Letting risk Guarantee rental income Government, private sector, RSLs
Table 4: Overcoming barriers to development 
Building the Rented Sector in Scotland Page 24
3.1.2   Partnership approaches to use of public land
Given current relative returns and funding constraints, 
making private renting stack up often requires a land 
owner, such as a local authority, NHS trust, etc., who is 
prepared to take an equity stake and/or is willing to defer 
receipt of payment until after the development is complete. 
An equity stake, which could include deferred payment for 
land, is another way of addressing the requirement that 
local authority assets be sold into the ‘highest and best 
use’, and could in principle be combined with a covenant 
and/or S75 approaches discussed above. 
Even so, a public owner would only allow land to be used 
for new private rented housing if it accepted that private 
renting as a necessary and desirable element in local 
housing provision. Also, because large-scale investment 
in private renting is still in its infancy (at least post-WWII), 
developers and institutions are looking for simple sites 
in the types of accessible location where demand is 
likely to be high. This may mean taking from commercial 
opportunities as much as from residential – and will usually 
require that sites are ‘shovel ready’ in order to reduce 
development risk. All of these requirements imply that 
both the public landowner and the local authority must 
have a strong commitment to new rented housing which 
may best be reflected in clear identification in local needs 
assessments. 
3.1.3   Scale of developments
Sufficient scale is seen as important for both developers 
and institutions if this new style private rental is to be made 
available. Equally, large sites are seen as the best way to 
meet housing requirements. The biggest benefit to the 
developer is that the rate of build-out in a development 
with a substantial proportion of rented housing can be 
much more rapid than developments that go entirely into 
owner-occupation (where there are rules of thumb about 
the number of units that can be sold and mortgaged each 
year). Especially in the current financial environment, where 
developers have difficulty raising debt finance without a 
large proportion of pre-sales, developers are seeing private 
renting as a desirable option especially for the early phases 
of large projects. For smaller projects, sales to international 
investors (who often place the units into the rented sector) 
and buy-to-let sales can play a similar role. 
One way forward is to have one or more aggregators that 
act as intermediaries to pull several projects by smaller 
construction firms together into the scale required by 
institutions. Some interviewees argued that although 
aggregation implies higher costs (because the units 
would be dispersed across several sites), there would 
be offsetting benefits in terms of an increased range of 
locations and diversification. THFC aggregates demand for 
debt finance for social and affordable housing, while other 
models (e.g. Bellerophon) aggregate demand for dwellings. 
Homes for Scotland have shown themselves to be well 
placed to play a role in identifying and bringing builders 
with an interest in selling into private renting together with 
potential funders. This is a role that could be extended, 
especially if some form of Build to Rent Fund were available 
to support the development phase. 
3.1.4   Forward funding 
Institutional investors will forward-fund some prime 
commercial projects, handling both short-term 
development funding and longer-term finance or purchase 
of the completed property. Although most investors and 
developers interviewed were clear that investors are mainly 
interested in purchasing completed and let schemes—as 
indeed is commonly the case in commercial property – 
there were examples of investors prepared to use this 
model in the private rented sector. Indeed, at least one 
financial institution planned to become directly involved 
in the development process and foresaw spending large 
amounts to purchase land and employ building contractors, 
once they were convinced that yields were sufficient. 
However these examples all ultimately required a secure 
fixed income stream. There were also indications that 
some developers were prepared to take on longer-term 
ownership responsibilities, perhaps looking for institutional 
funding once the development is mature. 
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3.2   Solutions to barriers around investor attitudes
The issues around investor attitudes have already been 
rehearsed. They cannot readily be overcome without 
adequate data and benchmarking capacity. Fundamentally 
it is a chicken-and-egg problem: once there are a few 
examples of investments that work, other investors will 
reduce their risk assessment and money can follow 
development. There are a few ‘early adopter’ investors 
active in the market now; when they can demonstrate 
success others will join them.
3.2.1   Concentrate on non-UK investors
In this context, there may be benefits from concentrating 
on non-UK investors. Several interviewees pointed out that 
non-UK organisations have taken a leading role in rented-
sector investment to date in other countries. Rental housing 
is a well-established investment category in countries 
like the USA (c.f. the involvement of the Washington State 
Pension Fund in new build for rent in London). Sovereign 
wealth funds operate with very long time horizons, and 
may have less shareholder pressure to produce immediate 
returns (c.f. Qatari Diar’s investment in London’s East 
Village). They may well provide an example that UK 
investors will follow. 
3.2.2   Employ social landlords as managers
Several interviewees suggested that housing associations 
could expand their role into the private sector by taking 
on letting and management, which neither most investors 
nor most developers wish to be involved in. This could 
help bridge the gap from development to production of 
an income generating residential asset whose ownership 
could be transferred. Investors may prefer housing 
associations to assume all void and management risks, 
which has been the case in the few examples identified 
in England. The Scottish Housing Regulator would need 
to take a view about the extent to which this would be 
permissible in the Scottish context.
Involving housing associations is seen as one important 
way of introducing professional management expertise. 
The need for quality management is generally regarded 
as both one of the barriers to building a professional 
private rented sector at scale, and one of the largest gaps 
in capacity. Housing associations and local authorities 
have expertise in managing rental housing. They differ in 
size and the degree to which they are already involved 
in commercial management, but the best are in a strong 
competitive position to provide services to investors. Many 
RSLs are not thought to be interested in becoming involved 
in this way, but some (particularly the larger associations) 
saw it as a definite business opportunity. 
Many of the investors we interviewed emphasised that 
private rented stock required a different management 
approach from social stock, and that social landlords would 
not be able to use the same techniques for both.
Other sources of quality management include major 
property consultants and agents who have long experience 
in commercial property management. Some developers 
are also prepared to play this role where they maintain an 
interest in the properties after completion. A number of 
well-known names in the field are looking to learn lessons 
from the USA, both about high-end properties where 
they see the benefits of providing additional services 
(e.g., restaurants, spas, gyms, concierges, etc.) and 
accommodation for middle-income families. 
One issue raised in this context is the type of lease that 
should be on offer. Most interviewees wanted no change in 
the legal lease framework (Short Assured Tenancies (SAT) 
in Scotland, Assured Shorthold Tenancies (AST) in England), 
but were prepared to look at longer leases - and lenders 
are also now looking closely at this. Some evidence from 
London suggests that tenants are less interested in longer 
leases than in knowing that they can renew the lease when 
it expires. 
3.3   Solutions to barriers around yield
The most common proposed solution to the perceived 
inadequacy of return from rented housing is that rents 
should be guaranteed in some way. This would provide 
certainty about the income stream, and the reduction in 
risk would enable investors to accept a lower yield (see 
discussion in Annex D). Existing examples mainly involve 
housing associations guaranteeing income or, at the least, 
a flow of appropriate tenants to maintain low vacancy 
rates in very specific circumstances such as care homes 
using the lease model. This is possible because rents in 
such developments are below market levels, which allows 
rents to rise and tenant types to change in the face of 
unexpected variations in demand or cost. 
Many investors are looking for government guarantees 
in this area, but so far government has only guaranteed 
long-term debt finance, not rental incomes. There are good 
reasons for this, not least is the difficulty in separating rental 
income from the effectiveness of the management function 
and leakage of risk from the private to the public sector. 
Currently a number of institutions are preparing to put their 
toes in the water – and not surprisingly trying to obtain all 
the help they can get from government. Government must 
decide which initiatives are worthy of support, and ensure 
that government benefits from uplift. 
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3.4   Solutions to barriers related to government policy
An issue raised by interviewees from several professional 
groups was the role of government itself, particularly in tax, 
regulation and policy. 
3.4.1   Land and Buildings Transactions Tax 
The Land and Buildings Transactions Tax (Scotland) Act 
2013 makes provision for a new tax to replace Stamp 
Duty Land Tax from April 2015 and introduces a more 
progressive tax structure. The 2011 UK Budget included 
changes to SDLT which meant that large-scale investors 
typically pay 1% instead of 5% on bulk purchases, with 
the tax now assessed on the average value of individual 
dwellings rather than on the overall value of the portfolio. 
This was seen as a major breakthrough in holding down 
transactions costs and increasing the incentive to invest at 
scale. Interviewees saw it as extremely important both that 
this would remain in place and that transaction-tax levels 
in Scotland should not rise significantly, as this would put 
Scotland at a disadvantage as compared to other parts 
of the United Kingdom. The first is clearly envisaged; the 
second is yet to be determined.
3.4.2   VAT, capital gains tax and REITS 
Other areas where taxation policy can impact on incentives 
to invest in private renting lie with VAT, Capital Gains 
tax and REITs as transparent tax-efficient instruments. 
REITs in particular are a potentially powerful mechanism 
for channelling investment into residential property, but 
they only come into play once mature portfolios can be 
assembled. They are less relevant to this report, which 
is about how the new housing that would go into such 
portfolios can be funded, but might become an important 
tool once a stock of investable housing has been created 
either from buy-to-let portfolios or from other owners. 
Currently responsibility for all of these lies with the UK 
Government. Were powers to be transferred to the Scottish 
Government it would be essential to keep the overall 
package of property taxation under review.
A final area of concern remains regulatory and policy 
change. All interviewees stressed the need for stability 
and clarity in both regulation and policy. In particular, no 
developer or institution wished to find themselves in a 
situation where they are taking downside risk without 
the possibility of upside gains. Memories are long and 
stakeholders can easily be frightened away, even by policy 
changes which apparently would have no direct impact on 
returns. 
Of particular importance is that any changes to 
rent determination or security of tenure should not 
disadvantage Scotland as compared to the rest of the 
United Kingdom. In this context, while some investors 
looking for index-linked income would be prepared to 
offer longer security than is currently available under SATs, 
and indeed to cap rent rises to a particular index, this was 
seen as an issue to be addressed in specific contracts not 
by changes in the regulatory framework. More generally, 
almost all stakeholders would prefer to maintain the current 
framework and to ensure predictability with respect to 
regulation and policy. In particular, they are concerned that 
the private rented sector should not appear more regulated 
than that in England as this could undermine investor 
interest. 
With respect to policy, the current government emphasis 
(both in the UK and Scottish governments) on supporting 
households into owner-occupation is important here. If 
effective, it will reduce demand for private renting from 
mainstream households – and probably benefit public 
finances in the longer term. If such initiatives offset cyclical 
decline but leave structural increases in demand for higher 
quality professionally managed private renting untouched, 
there is little reason to be concerned about longer-term 
demand. However, the evidence on the relative importance 
of cyclical and structural changes is unclear, and it is 
important that government initiatives do not narrow the gap 
for effective initiatives to provide privately rented housing. 
In Scotland, similar issues surround grant availability for 
social housing and for mid- market/affordable solutions. 
These meet demands further down the income scale but 
still affect the numbers looking for accommodation in the 
private rented sector overall. 
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4  Ways forward: new approaches to 
investment and finance
A major focus of this report is how to ensure adequate 
funding for much larger scale investment in the rental 
sector than has been achieved in the past decades. In the 
last few decades long-term funding for housing has come 
from three main sources: individual equity; debt finance 
and government grant/subsidy. So owner-occupation 
depends upon the owner occupiers’ own equity together 
with mortgage finance; social housing depends upon 
debt finance and past and present government grant; 
while the growing private rented sector has been funded 
basically in the same way as owner-occupation. The main 
innovations have been in the range of debt instruments for 
both individual owners and social landlords and in UK and 
Scottish Government initiatives mainly in the intermediate 
low-cost home ownership sector which allow different 
mixes of equity, debt and the timing of payments (e.g., via 
shared equity and rent-to-buy models). Intermediate rental 
market products in Scotland are also beginning to play a 
role. The big gap is therefore the lack of either equity or 
debt finance for private rented investment. 
The other major finance requirement is for development 
finance, which again comes mainly in the form of 
debt or developer equity, sometimes and increasingly 
supplemented by private equity. This is the financing 
area that has been most affected by the credit crunch 
with large scale overhangs affecting both developers and 
banks which has led to a very limited appetite to provide 
(or indeed take on) new loans. Here there appears to be 
growing interest among investors in directly challenging the 
developer route. An alternative is for the investors to work 
with the developers to the point where the certainty of 
longer term investment will de-risk the development stage 
to a point where debt finance will become available. 
In the past, institutional investors have not been convinced 
that the yield available is adequate given the risks involved. 
Clearly this involves detailed examination at a project 
level, and typically financial models are used to (i) identify 
the scale and drivers of this gap, breaking down all the 
elements involved in making decisions to determine what 
they are prepared to pay for land and for the completed 
development (as described in detail in Annex D), and (ii) 
develop approaches to overcoming the gap by reducing 
costs and/or risk. Obviously not all of these will be internal 
to the project and may involve government support in the 
form either of subsidy or guarantees. Most models do not 
directly address the range of barriers identified in section 2 
but rather concentrate on the core issues of return and risk 
– and therefore the preparedness of the private investors 
to be involved in the sector. These barriers were addressed 
in section 3.
4.1    Routes to financing additional rented housing 
As stated above, the core of the financing issue is how to 
provide an acceptable risk/return package to the investor. 
Most of the solutions we examined are based on the 
provision of intermediate rather than market housing. 
This is mainly because they involve some element of 
government subsidy or guarantee, or a strong covenant to 
service the investment through a lease which guarantees 
income to the investor. As a result risks are reduced – but 
also rents are often held below market levels. Table 5 sets 
out the essential characteristics of four approaches to 
channelling more funding into new construction of rented 
housing, with examples of existing or proposed schemes. 
Annex E describes the operation of some of these schemes 
in more detail.
4.1.1   Lease models
In these models, investors develop housing for social, 
affordable and/or private rent, which is leased to local 
authorities or housing associations to operate for a 
specified period. Institutions provide equity funding for 
development and receive income from lease payments. 
M&G and Bellerophon have both started to work with this 
model. One example is Stratford Halo where the properties 
have been purchased from the housing association by 
the institutional investor on a 160 year lease. The housing 
association in return holds the management contract and 
provides a guaranteed income. Thus risks associated with 
the income stream lie with the association. It is not yet 
clear whether such schemes can be attractive to investors 
without some form of guarantee associated with them.
4.1.2   Direct purchase models
Perhaps the most straightforward models are those based 
on outright purchase. Here the developer produces 
housing, which is sold as an income-producing asset to an 
investor. Most of the models produced to date on this basis 
incorporate a government guarantee of the income stream 
to address investors’ need for certainty about revenue. 
Proposals that use this approach include the Resolution 
Foundation’s model and a proposed scheme by Halycon 
City Living in Glasgow. 
Something similar is now operating in the former Olympic 
Village in London, where Qatari Diar Delancey bought 
1500 of the units from the Olympic Delivery Authority 
and are soon to put them on the market at market rents 
without a guarantee – but with potential contractual 
exit arrangements in place. Some of our interviewees 
suggested that while this approach might work in London’s 
high-demand environment, investors were more likely to 
require an income guarantee before they would consider 
investing in Scotland.
Ways forward: 
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4.1.3   Aggregated bond models
In these models housing associations jointly participate 
in a bond issue (thus providing the size investors require), 
receiving long-term, relatively cheap funding secured on 
their existing assets. They can use the funds to finance 
new construction of social, affordable or market rented 
housing. Institutions participate as bond purchasers. To 
date such bonds have been used only to finance housing 
associations, although in principle they could work for large 
private providers as well. Large construction companies 
also issue own-name bonds. The UK-wide Housing Finance 
Corporation is the only organisation that has to date issued 
such bonds (since 1987), but Carduus is aiming to issue 
their first bond for Scottish housing associations. 
4.1.4   Models that harness borrowing capacity  
   of local authorities
In these models local authorities form joint ventures or 
LLPs with partners which lever in private sector investment 
alongside local authority borrowing. The Scottish 
Government mitigates the local authorities’ financial risk via 
the mechanisms described in the table below. All or some 
of the units are eventually sold, most probably into owner-
occupation.
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Name Who 
provides 
fund?
Who owns 
& operates 
housing?
Security or 
guarantee
Will it 
finance new 
build rental 
housing?
How many 
existing 
deals?
Procurement/
state aid issues?
Does it provide 
aggregation? 
aggregation?
Issues
LEASE MODELS 
 Mechanism: Investors develop housing for social, affordable and/or private rent, which is leased to local authorities or  
housing associations to operate for a specified period. Institutions provide equity funding for development and receive | 
income from lease payments.
Examples
Bellerophon Annuity fund Joint public/
private LLP owns; 
local authorities 
or housing assns 
operate, with 
option to buy out 
private sector
No government 
guarantee – 
although argues 
this would make 
the scheme; 
local authority 
lease obviates 
void and 
management risk 
for LLP
Yes—social, 
submarket or 
market rented 
housing
Three sites 
in Wales with 
one further 
regeneration 
scheme recently 
announced 
Procurement Yes Local authority  
or RSL needs to 
be comfortable 
with rental levels 
and adequate 
cost coverage 
for repairs
M&G Investment fund Investor 
owns; housing 
associations 
operate
No government 
guarantee, 
but housing 
association 
provides 
fixed income 
payments 
Yes—affordable 
and private 
One on this 
exact model in 
London
No No - large 
minimum size
Investment only 
takes place 
after planning 
permission 
secured
DIRECT PURCHASE MODELS
Mechanism: Developer produces housing for affordable and/or market rent and sells a majority share/all of it to investors. 
Investors receive rental stream and housing associations or private sector managers operate the stock. Institutions participate  
as equity investors.
Examples
Resolution 
Foundation
Institutions Investors 
own, housing 
associations 
operate
Looking for 
possible 
government 
guarantee on 
return
Model based 
on existing 
sites. Market & 
affordable.
None - 
demonstration 
exercise to show 
financial viability
None identified Yes
Halcyon  
City Living
Institutions Investors own, 
developer and 
partners operate
Looking for 
possible 
government 
guarantee 
of income or 
shortfall
Yes - on 
identified sites. 
Market only. 
None - still under 
development
None identified No
AGGREGATED BOND FINANCING MODELS
Mechanism: Housing associations jointly participate in bond issue, receiving long-term relatively cheap funding secured on their 
existing assets. They can use funds to finance new construction of social/affordable rented housing. Institutions participate as 
bond purchasers. 
Examples
Carduus Bond investors 
(city institutions)
Housing 
associations or 
their subsidiaries
No government 
guarantee; 
secured from 
associations’ 
existing stock
Some - % of 
funding will go 
to refinancing 
existing debt, 
which in turn can 
facilitate new 
build
None yet No No Proportion of 
funding will go 
to refinance 
existing 
obligations
Table 5: Examples of four approaches to channel funding into rented housing
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Name Who 
provides 
fund?
Who owns 
& operates 
housing?
Security or 
guarantee
Will it 
finance new 
build rental 
housing?
How many 
existing 
deals?
Procurement/
state aid issues?
Does it provide 
aggregation? 
aggregation?
Issues
MODELS THAT HARNESS BORROWING CAPACITY OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES   
Mechanism: Local authorities borrow money, usually from the PWLB, which they lend on to a Special Purpose Vehicle to build 
housing for affordable rent. SPV operates housing and makes loan repayments from revenues. Institutions could participate.
Examples
Rettie 
Resonance
PWLB via local 
authorities
Public-private 
SPV; local 
authorities 
or housing 
associations 
operate
A capped 
Government 
contingency 
fund to mitigate 
repayment risk 
of local authority 
loans
Yes—mid-market A few in Scotland No No Profit deferred 
until sale of units
National 
Housing Trust – 
original model 
for councils and 
developers
Usually PWLB 
lending via local 
authorities on 
lending to LLP.
SPVs comprising 
the developer, 
Scottish Futures 
Trust and local 
authorities
Government 
guarantee of 
local authority 
loans – capital 
and interest 
shortfall
Yes—mid-market Approval for over 
1000 homes 
with further 
procurement 
underway
OJEU 
procurement 
process 
managed by 
SFT – state aid 
requirements 
managed by 
participating 
parties.
No Developers’ 
return on equity 
deferred until 
sale of units
National 
Housing Trust – 
council variant
Usually PWLB 
via local 
authorities
SPVs comprising 
SFT and local 
authorities
Government 
guarantee of 
local authority 
loans- capped 
interest 
shortfalls
Yes – mid 
market
175 homes 
approved, more 
in pipeline
Local authorities 
manage any 
procurement 
required
No No
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4.2   Government initiatives: Scotland
The traditional form of government support for housing 
construction in Scotland continues to be capital grants for 
social housing. In the past, such housing was concentrated 
on mono-tenure estates, but current policy requiring 25% 
social housing on all new developments is meant to change 
this pattern. Output levels have been proportionately high 
by UK standards, running at between 4,200 and 5,800 new 
homes over the last five years.
In addition to more general affordable housing schemes 
(usually encouraging low cost homeownership) there have 
been three specific programmes to spur new construction: 
GRO Grant (now rarely used), the National Housing Trust 
initiative (NHT) and now Help to Buy (Scotland). The 
current NHT scheme is described more fully in Annex D. It 
has gained considerable acceptance among developers, 
local authorities and housing associations. Many see it 
as far more acceptable than full market rental products, 
for several reasons—it delivers affordable housing, 
safeguards developers and allows them to complete large 
developments more quickly. However, some doubt has 
been expressed about how widely it can be pursued as it is 
not seen as viable in areas where the gap between market 
and social rent is relatively limited. 
Help to Buy (Scotland) is a shared equity scheme launched 
by the Scottish Government in September 2013, aimed at 
purchasers of new build homes costing up to £400,000. 
The Scottish Government will take an equity stake of 
up to 20% of the value of the property, with the buyer’s 
deposit and mortgage covering the remainder. No interest 
is charged on the government’s equity stake. While there 
is no formal income limit, an affordability assessment is 
carried out and support is only offered to buyers who could 
not reasonably afford to purchase the home without the 
equity stake. Borrowers remain fully responsible for their 
mortgage payments and any shortfall in the normal way. To 
some extent Help to Buy (Scotland) provides an alternative 
to private renting for those who could reasonably afford 
a mortgage, However the initiative is cash limited and 
dependent on consumer demand, with funds committed for 
new-build completions up to end of March 2016. There are 
similar schemes operating in England and Wales although 
the details vary. 
4.3   Government initiatives: UK-wide
The UK has a range of initiatives to support the recovery of 
the new build market, mainly in the form of guarantees. 
4.3.1   Help to Buy Guarantee Scheme
The UK-wide Help to Buy Guarantee scheme launched 
in October 2013, offering support to lenders to provide a 
range of mortgages at up to a 95% loan-to-value for homes 
worth less than £600,000. Depending on the size of the 
deposit, the UK government will then guarantee to the 
lender up to 15% of the property’s value in return for a fee. 
Lenders are able to choose which sections of the market 
they will support (i.e., new build, existing homes and/or 
remortgages); what loan-to-value ratio they will employ and 
when and how they will phase participation in the scheme. 
4.3.2   The Affordable Rents Guarantee Programme 
This uses the UK Government’s fiscal credibility to 
reduce the cost of borrowing for non-profit registered or 
community-led housing providers, as well as to attract 
investment from fixed-income investors seeking a stable, 
long-term return on their investment without exposure 
to residential rental property risk. Affordable Housing 
Finance Plc (AHF), a subsidiary of The Housing Finance 
Corporation, has signed an exclusive licence with the 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government 
to offer guaranteed long-term debt to registered providers 
that develop new affordable rental properties. This 
programme has been underway since July 2013 and 
applies across the whole of the UK. It should significantly 
reduce the cost of funding and so increase housing 
associations’ capacity to expand output levels of both 
social and affordable housing. However it will do nothing 
directly to support equity investment from institutions that 
have no requirement for debt. 
4.3.3   The Private Rented Sector  
    Housing Guarantee Scheme 
This scheme is intended to support the building of new 
homes for the private rented sector across the UK, offering 
housing providers a direct UK Government guarantee 
on debt they raise, mainly in the form of bonds, to invest 
in new privately rented homes into the longer term. This 
will help to reduce their borrowing costs, increasing the 
number of homes they can afford to provide.
The guarantee is designed specifically to attract investment 
into the private rented sector from fixed-income investors 
who want a stable, long-term return on investment without 
exposure to residential property risk and who wish at least 
in part to use debt finance. The guarantee applies to that 
debt finance. Initially the Department for Communities and 
Local Government will assess applications for schemes in 
England to determine whether they comply with scheme 
rules, can demonstrate a solid management structure, 
suitable asset cover, a viable exit strategy, robust rental 
demand, and are clear on where and how they will raise 
the debt. 
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All of these UK-wide schemes either directly reduce the 
cost of borrowing or increase access to finance - for the 
mortgagor, the housing association or the private investor. 
That for housing associations directly impacts on schemes 
aimed at providing affordable housing. The scale required 
for the private rented sector guarantee puts it outside 
the reach of current private rental schemes in Scotland, 
but aims to support large scale new investment in the 
sector (although some aggregation of projects may help 
overcome this barrier). 
4.4   Government initiatives: England only 
There is only one current UK Government scheme directed 
at the private rented sector which is England only and 
does not have a similar scheme operating in Scotland. It 
directly addresses the issues of funding and risk associated 
with the development stage of providing new investment 
in private renting. It may provide a helpful example for 
Scottish policy makers. An earlier scheme introduced 
by the GLA has also been included as a forerunner of 
emerging schemes. 
4.4.1   The Build to Rent Fund
The Build to Rent Fund is aimed at supporting the 
development of new purpose-built privately rented 
homes in England. In particular it will provide ‘off the 
shelf’ investment opportunities to longer term investors, 
reduces financing costs to developers and helps takes 
the risk out of building homes to let. The Fund is a fully 
recoverable commercially priced loan – thus involving no 
state aid – which can be used to fund the purchase of land, 
construction costs and management. Once the scheme is 
fully let the developer must sell on its interest or re-finance 
and repay the loan/equity. The fund will also be used to 
build innovative demonstration projects to show what a 
more professional, larger scale private rented market might 
look like. The original budget of £200 million has been 
increased to £1 billion. Some developers we spoke to said 
that they had already been considering production of PRS-
specific housing before the introduction of the Fund and 
the Build to Rent initiative offered an incentive for them to 
get into the business. Again, this will do nothing directly 
to support equity investment from institutions that do not 
require debt. 
At the present time there is no similar scheme in Scotland 
to provide market-priced finance to enable development. 
It would be within the Scottish Government’s powers to 
introduce something on similar lines. 
4.4.2   Greater London Authority partnerships
The first major attempt in the UK to bring institutional 
investors directly into new build private renting in modern 
times was undertaken by the Greater London Authority  
in the mid/late 2000s.  
The GLA identified several large sites where public land 
was available and attempted to develop partnerships 
between the main stakeholders to fund large-scale 
development. Only on one site was a partnership put in 
place, but it did not progress to the point of construction. 
This was partly because of the financial crisis but more 
fundamentally because yields could not be guaranteed, 
and therefore the initiative failed. 
4.5   Conclusions
In this section we have confined our discussion to models, 
whether private sector or government-led, that aim to 
reduce risks and increase yields to the point where 
investors are prepared to provide the finance to enable 
new private housing development to proceed. Only one of 
these schemes directly addresses the costs and availability 
of development finance. The others look at different ways 
of encouraging investment through guarantees, subsidies 
and contractual arrangements which mainly aim to provide 
a predictable income stream for investors prepared to 
commit to the longer term. 
Apart from the mid-market rent programme, all of the 
government sponsored initiatives have only been in place 
for a very short time. Most of the financial models, again 
with the exception of the original NHT initiative, are also 
work in progress. Thus there are large numbers of untried 
initiatives in the innovation space. The key questions 
are therefore which ones are winners and which barriers 
remain. 
It is worth noting that subsidies and guarantees often bring 
into play either European Union procurement procedures, 
when public bodies are involved as providers, or state-aid 
issues when public bodies are not involved. Both tend to 
increase the costs of administration. 
The evidence set out above suggests that channelling 
institutional finance into private renting and into a segment 
of the housing market providing high quality housing for 
a wide range of households is highly desirable. It also 
suggests that it is not a quick win. Indeed as Table 6 makes 
clear, there is a range of market, affordable and social 
rented housing approaches which are already embedded 
in policy and finance. 
Everyone agrees that this is the best opportunity in a 
lifetime – and there are stakeholders in all categories 
prepared to make it work. The objective must be to harness 
this enthusiasm as quickly as possible. The benefit that 
could be achieved from encouraging demonstration 
projects in the current environment is clear. Our 
recommendations seek to provide some ways forward. 
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Type of new housing Advantages of targeting 
support here
Obstacles Who could take action  
and how
Intermediate rental including NHT Small but working well 
Relatively well understood and now 
extended to long-term rent 
Easy for smaller developers and 
partnerships to take part
•	 	Belief	that	only	works	in	a	few	 
areas – BUT gapsbetween even  
LHA and social rent appear quite large 
in many places
•	 	Procurement	and	administrative	 
costs high
Government: improve statistics on rents 
and types of demand at local level; 
provide funds as for social housing 
Homes for Scotland could provide 
information good practice or indeed  
a prospectus to help new developers 
enter market 
Buy-to-let Well established but hit by credit crunch 
and confidence 
Small scale within owner-occupation 
sites, so expands demand where capital 
gains expected 
Worked well when credit readily 
available; did increase output and modify 
built stock, at least in England 
•	 	Credit	still	limited
•	 	Demand	depend	on	gap	between	Mid-
Market Rents and market rents
•	 Significant	issues	around	management
•	 	Landlords’	desire	to	realise	capital 
values affects sustainability
Financial market 
Government: identify gaps in market
Local authorities: determine densities/
types of unit etc 
REITs one way of maintaining  
properties in the rental sector.  
Currently UK Government to review 
Student housing Now a well-established model, often 
with university partnership and usually 
in central urban areas. It shows new 
markets can be created
•	 Depends	on	growth	of	HE	sector
•	 	Require	good	management	and	local	
authority permissions
•	 Local	antipathy	in	some	areas
Working group to clarify interest from 
institutional investors as well as RSLs  
and property companies with 
management experience
Market rent for young professional 
and shorter term migrants and mobile 
households
Higher density small unit  
developments in high demand areas  
Few good examples as yet
•	 	Desire	among	some	investors	for	
guaranteed income streams
•	 Uncertainty	about	management	costs	
•	 	Competition	from	commercial	sector	–	
apartment hotels etc
Local authority: appropriate regulations 
on density
Demonstration projects by government 
and other stakeholders 
Private sector to address development 
funding problems: self funding, employer 
or institutional funding 
Large scale new build private  
rented sector housing 
Plenty of investor interest could be 
unlocked with guarantees or subsidy
(i) Build to Rent
(ii)  Demonstration sites with covenanted 
PRS (or equivalent)
(iii) Funding guarantees for ownership
•	 	Competition	for	sites	with	owner	
occupation
•	 	Development	finance	at	reasonable	
cost and other ways of de-risking the 
development stage;
•	 Need	for	benchmarking	data
•	 Need	for	management	platform
•	 	Intermediary	required	to	bring	
developers and institutions together
Government: Build to Rent fund; 
guarantees for RSLs/RPs and private 
borrowing
Government and industry: initiatives  
to improve data; create functioning 
projects to reduce risk aversion; 
designate champions (including 
institutions) involved in development 
RSLs: act as intermediaries
Table 6: Possible channels for increasing new investment in rental housing in Scotland
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5 Conclusions: bringing the evidence together 
5.1   Reasons to grow the rental sector
There are at least four reasons that this is the time to grow 
the rental sector, and especially the private market sector:
•	 	Household	growth	is	projected	to	increase	more	rapidly	
than in past decades. Reasonable assumptions imply that 
well over 20,000 dwellings per annum will be necessary 
to keep up with requirements, of which perhaps 7,000 – 
8,000 could be rental units;
•	  Output levels are particularly low but there is 
considerable capacity to increase activity as well as the 
appetite to look at new ways to achieve the necessary 
investment; 
•	  The private rented sector has been growing rapidly, not 
only for cyclical but also structural reasons. This points to 
the need to develop a higher-quality, more professional 
sector to meet continuing demand from both younger 
and more mobile employed households and from family 
households looking for secure homes; and
•	  The current constraints on mortgage supply and access 
to mortgages will generate sustained demand for a 
high-quality, accessible private rented sector. Opening 
up institutional investment leverages in new sources of 
funds matched to an asset class with long-term potential.
This environment provides the best opportunity in a lifetime 
to increase private investment in housing in general (and 
in private renting in particular) and to bring about radical 
change in the quality of provision. This is a vision worth 
working for.
5.2   Problems with current patterns of market supply
The current pattern of provision of market housing in 
Scotland, as in the rest of the UK, is based on owner 
occupation - itself a sector under pressure and where 
finance is constrained. Land prices therefore incorporate 
expectations of capital gains which are not usually included 
in long-term rental yield assessments, so buyers who would 
use the land for rental housing find it hard to compete. The 
most successful rental model to date has been buy-to-let, in 
part because these investors make the same assumptions 
about capital gains as owner-occupiers do, and in part 
because the stock they purchase is usually equally suitable 
for home ownership – and indeed the expectation is that 
it will be transferred into owner-occupation at some stage. 
Government-supported intermediate housing follows 
a similar trajectory: it either goes directly into owner-
occupation or starts out as sub-market rental products - 
many of which eventually will be sold into  
owner-occupation. 
In some parts of the country rental returns may be equal to 
or exceed those for owner occupation, but these are areas 
where capital gains are not factored in because of lower 
demand. These are not areas where new build private 
renting can flourish. This suggests either that investment 
specifically for private renting needs to be purpose built on 
land and at a scale that is particularly suited to the rental 
market (and so can compete against owner-occupation),  
or that some form of government support is required to 
make it viable.
5.3   Student accommodation – a successful model
The most successful model developed over the last 
decade for creating new build accommodation was student 
housing - although the strong investment in the sector was 
an unintended by-product of a government initiative, the 
Business Expansion Scheme, which incentivised individuals 
to invest by providing an exit strategy. In response to this 
opportunity the finance industry, together with universities 
and in some cases housing associations, developed a risk-
free model which was then translated into a form suitable 
for institutional investors. 
In Scotland the BES scheme led to the construction of 
purpose-built student accommodation and facilities-
management arrangements, especially in Edinburgh and 
Glasgow. Originally, universities provided the land and took 
the risks, while investors generally purchased completed 
units and received an indexed rental stream backed by 
university assets. These conditions have now been relaxed 
and there is considerable institutional investment in new 
student accommodation without university or housing 
association support – but with the benefit that student 
housing is seen as satisfying housing need so there is no 
S75 requirement. 
This model suggests three important lessons: 
•	  First, this form of investment came very close to the well-
understood commercial property model, where there 
is a long-term contract, the investor receives a certain 
income which rises with prices (or, ideally, incomes) and 
capital gains are not part of the equation; 
•	  Second, it takes a long time to develop a market from 
one where government ensured a near-riskless income 
stream to a mature freestanding market that depends 
on demand (even if it is seen as near certain to increase) 
and incomes that rise with economic growth; 
•	  Third, government incentives can provide an opportunity 
for a new market to demonstrate potential. 
It is only in the last few years that mainstream institutions 
have put in significant funding. Investors have relaxed their 
requirements, and early government incentives have now 
given way to a mature market.
Conclusions: 
bringing the evidence together
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5.4   What are the barriers?
Institutional investors, as suggested above, ideally want 
guaranteed returns which rise automatically over time. 
Residential property has the immense benefit that net rents 
can generally be expected to rise with incomes – exactly 
what annuity funds in particular are looking for.  
On the other hand, institutions have almost no experience 
of the asset class, their management systems make it 
difficult to bring in new assets, and the necessary data 
for benchmarking are not readily available. Some of our 
interviewees noted that ‘a champion’ within an organisation 
could change institutional attitudes, and cited real evidence 
of increasing involvement in the sector. However, the 
data issue remains crucial – IPD is the only source of 
information available about existing institutional (including 
housing association) investment. The database is inherently 
London-centric and so far includes only a very small 
number of Scottish units. 
Looking at the process by which development is initiated, 
constructed and transferred into ownership, the three big 
areas where returns need be increased and/or de-risked 
are:
(i)  the costs to developers of obtaining land with 
planning permission, and financing land purchase and 
construction; 
(ii)  the risks and costs around transferring developments 
into longer-term ownership, and 
(iii)  the size of the gap between gross and net rents, 
which depends on management costs and quality. 
The financial models emerging are based mainly on 
•	  public ownership of land, public/private partnerships for 
development and leases and contractual restrictions to 
ensure long-term private rental; 
•	  housing associations or local authorities bringing 
near-guaranteed income, basic scale and experienced 
management to the contracts with institutions; and 
•	  initiatives from sovereign wealth funds, overseas pension 
funds and a small number of leading UK institutions 
where there are senior managers who see an important 
opportunity. 
The Montague Report came at a particularly important 
time. There was growing interest by institutions but many 
outstanding issues, and the report succinctly spelled 
out these issues and made recommendations that were 
quickly followed up by the UK Government. The resulting 
initiatives have concentrated on ensuring finance for the 
development process at market rates through the Build to 
Rent Fund in England, and providing guarantees to reduce 
the costs of borrowing to support long-term investors 
across the UK. The report also led to the appointment of 
a task force which aims to address any further barriers as 
they emerge. 
There has been very little done directly to address 
the problems of ensuring availability of suitable sites, 
transferring properties at scale from developer to long-term 
owner or the lack of high-quality management platforms. 
The issue of site availability has risen rapidly up the agenda 
even during the period of this research. There are different 
approaches emerging to the process of property transfer, 
including developers maintaining ownership at least for 
a period, early agreements with institutions which help 
reduce the cost of funding, and institutions themselves 
leading on development. So far most of the solutions on 
management involve housing associations – but they have 
their own issues to address, and their experience is of a 
very different type of management. 
In the Scottish context there is undoubtedly a similar level 
of enthusiasm and activity among stakeholders, but there 
are some important differences from the rest of the UK. 
These include:
(a)  long-term demand. Before the financial crisis, total 
output levels were running at over 25,000 homes per 
annum, which more than kept pace with household 
formation. Social and affordable housing completions 
reached a peak of over 8,000 units in 2009-10 and 
were over 6,000 in 2012-13. If in future capital grants 
remain generous, mid-market initiatives become more 
embedded in the system (which of itself would be 
highly desirable as they help meet the requirement 
for lower-subsidy housing) and Help to Buy effectively 
supports increasing investment in owner-occupation, 
there may be relatively little interest - either from 
builders or consumers - in the expansion of new 
build private rental outside the biggest cities. This 
is not a desirable outcome. There clearly is a need 
for purpose-built private rented development to 
meet structural changes in demand and to support 
economic growth and a flexible labour market;
Building the Rented Sector in Scotland Page 36
(b)  scale of development. Most Scottish builders are 
relatively small and even if they work together on a 
development probably will not be able to generate 
the scale necessary on a single project to attract 
institutional investors. This suggests some potential 
for aggregation across sites;
(c)  identification of sites. As yet there has been little 
interest from local authorities and other public 
agencies in specifically supporting private renting 
through the identification of land and its potential 
allocation to mixed development including private 
renting (a role currently undertaken in England by the 
Housing and Communities Agency); and 
(d)  Scottish Government support for private renting.  
The Scottish Government has not indicated that they 
are considering any equivalent to the English Build to 
Rent Fund. At the same time, perceived uncertainties 
around some aspects of legislation are negatively 
impacting on some stakeholder attitudes.
Yet there are many reasons for optimism. Land is available 
and housing supply is more responsive in Scotland than 
in England; there are many stakeholders with particular 
interests in supporting the Scottish economy and others 
looking for opportunities to invest especially in the major 
cities; and there is a strong sense of partnership and 
capacity to coordinate, reflecting the scale of the country. 
The creation of a few successful operational schemes will 
show that barriers have been overcome. What is needed 
now is a plan of action and the will to carry it forward. 
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6 Recommendations
There are a number of stakeholders that need to be 
proactively involved in ensuring the successful extended 
development of the rented sector in Scotland. They include 
at least the following: builders and developers, financial 
institutions, property management and service providers, 
housing associations, trade bodies, local government 
and the Scottish Government. All already have an active 
interest, but most do not see developing a new model of 
private renting as their first priority. This has to change if the 
opportunities now becoming available are to be realised. 
6.1   Recommendations
The recommendations are ordered by the main issues that 
need to be addressed: improving information, smoothing 
the path for development, engaging institutional interest 
and providing high-quality management. 
To deliver on these recommendations will require 
commitment by all stakeholders although where possible 
we have identified the appropriate leadership.  
The first four recommendations address issues around how 
better to inform these stakeholders of the opportunities 
that could exist or already do. 
Recommendation 1
There should be a small focused and time-limited working 
party set up, possibly led by the development industry and 
facilitated by the Scottish Government. Building on this 
report, it would identify and monitor pinch-points that are 
holding back development and institutional involvement, 
recommend how these could be overcome and inform 
stakeholders about mechanisms being employed.
Recommendation 2
The working party should identify a Private Rented Sector 
Champion who would chair the group and take forward the 
initiatives it identified as necessary to enable potentially 
viable projects to reach fruition.
Recommendation 3
An acceptable residential benchmark index for Scotland 
needs to be put in place. The IPD index is the only 
suitable index available, but it includes only a few Scottish 
residential properties. IPD is working to extend its coverage 
across the UK, and institutional owners, landlords and 
housing associations need to take the lead in providing 
data to IPD; negotiating with them about what is necessary 
to generate a Scotland- specific index; and agreeing with 
IPD how more broadly located property information could 
be of value to decision-makers in institutions and housing 
associations. 
Recommendation 4
A more detailed analysis should be undertaken of who is 
in the market and intermediate rented sectors and why 
to support better understanding of future new construction 
market opportunities. Such research might be supported by 
the construction industry and/or interested institutions as 
well as by the Scottish Government.
The next seven recommendations relate to the housing 
development stage.
Recommendation 5
The valuation of rented housing means that developments 
of rented housing often cannot outbid owner-occupied 
housing. In addition, planning risk and the need to identify 
appropriate sites in suitable areas where private renting 
has a comparative advantage must be addressed. We 
recommend that local authorities, initially in Edinburgh, 
Glasgow, Aberdeen and Inverness, make suitable 
demonstration sites available for residential rental 
development that will give the opportunity for large scale 
institutional investment. The local authorities could act 
as equity stakeholders of that land and host competitions 
among developers and investors to provide higher-density 
new developments in central city areas with a mix of 
tenures (including e.g., owner-occupied, market rented and 
affordable homes).
Recommendations
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Recommendation 6
In this context it may be appropriate for the Scottish 
Government and local authorities to consider effectively 
supporting a limited number of initial projects to 
demonstrate demand potential for all involved. Whilst 
it would be difficult to use funding for such a role it might 
be value for money in that it could demonstrate the social 
value of building a professionally rented sector and 
would allow the Scottish Government to have a say in the 
standards being applied. 
Recommendation 7
The issue of how to contract developments to ensure 
properties remain in private renting into the longer 
term must be examined. We recommend that the Scottish 
Government leads on more detailed discussion on how the 
2010 and 2011 Acts can best support the use of long leases. 
A study of whether and how a form of ‘covenanted’ private 
renting as being tested for publicly owned land in England 
might be made operational within Scottish law. 
Recommendation 8 
Local authorities should carefully consider how they might 
better evidence the need for private rented housing 
within their Housing Need and Demand Assessments. We 
recommend that local authorities strengthen their analysis 
of demand across tenures, identifying private renting 
separately where appropriate. 
Recommendation 9
Local authorities should consider exercising more 
flexibility in the determination of S75 and similar 
developer contributions.  We do not support the idea 
that market-rented housing should be treated as if it were 
affordable, but we recommend that local authorities should 
consider exercising flexibility in assessing S75 and similar 
developer contributions from rental housing developments 
addressing particular needs such as for higher density 
provision for younger households as has been done with 
respect to student accommodation.
Recommendation 10 
There are specific opportunities to expand the student 
accommodation and young professional sector. We 
recommend that the working group enter into discussion 
with universities, employers, local authorities, Homes 
for Scotland and potential providers to come up with 
a detailed building specification for high-density 
accommodation for students, young professionals and 
mobile singles.
Recommendation 11
While it is too early to say for certain that the Build to Rent 
Fund has proved to be value for money in England it has 
undoubtedly brought new players into the market and 
raised the possibility of large scale investment becoming 
more readily available for purchase by institutions. We 
therefore recommend that the Scottish Government 
consider creating its own market-priced Build to Rent 
Fund. 
The next five recommendations address the issue of how 
to match institutional investment with new development. 
Recommendation 12
In order to raise awareness of the opportunities for 
institutional investment in Scotland we recommend that 
the working party’s role includes the development of a 
prospectus to attract institutional investment in rental 
housing in Scotland. 
Recommendation 13
In line with this approach we recommend that Scottish 
Financial Enterprise (SFE) set up a Sector Policy Group 
to explore the potential for the industry to engage with 
investing in this sector and to secure the pre-conditions 
for it to do so.
Recommendation 14
Developers and institutions, especially those who have 
already been involved in discussions with government and 
other stakeholders, should take an active part in taking 
forward the sites identified as suitable demonstration 
sites available for residential rental development under 
Recommendation 6 to completion and transfer. 
Recommendation 15
Aggregation could be one way of bringing institutional 
funds into both market and intermediate through the 
transfer of single developments into diversified portfolios. 
We therefore recommend that Homes for Scotland 
develop its role as a potential aggregator in partnership 
with the industry. 
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Recommendation 16
The private rent guarantee scheme which is still in the 
early days of development in the English context is a UK-
wide scheme. It involves state aid and therefore provides 
a subsidy to investors who wish to use debt finance for 
purchase. This may offer a new source of funding for a 
range of institutions. We recommend that the construction 
sector and landlords in Scotland consider this route and 
pursue applications where an opportunity arises to do so. 
The next two recommendations relate to barriers with 
respect to management.
Recommendation 17
The costs of management and maintenance and their 
effect on the gap between gross and net yield remain 
a serious problem area. What little evidence there is 
suggests that these costs are above average in Scotland. 
A study of the reasons for high management costs 
and how they might be reduced is required. Housing 
associations, management agents and consultants involved 
in providing management services should be encouraged 
to examine good practice as well as investigating whether 
management of purpose-built provision costs less. 
Recommendation 18
Equally there needs to be better understood and more 
transparent means of ensuring that consumers can expect 
professional standards of management. The working group 
should consider how best to recognise and encourage 
good management practice in the sector without adding  
to the regulatory burden on landlords.    
Bringing these different elements together is a major task 
involving both vision and detail. Recommendation 19 sets 
out a starting point. 
Recommendation 19
We do not make any recommendation suggesting that 
one specific model is the best approach to developing 
a professional private rented sector. The evidence of 
developments across the UK is that there are many 
different approaches which will work in different 
circumstances and it is far too early to rule out possibilities. 
We therefore recommend that the working party takes 
initial responsibility for cataloguing and assessing 
existing and proposed financial models for additional 
provision of rented housing across the UK.  
The final recommendation provides a word of warning and 
addresses the issue of maintaining continued confidence 
and competitiveness in the development of a professional 
private rented sector at scale. 
Recommendation 20
One of the most important messages from this research 
has been the need for stability in the policy, taxation and 
regulatory environments. Although there is enthusiasm 
and considerable activity, there is also fragility. We 
therefore recommend that the Scottish Government 
should ensure that all parties are fully aware of the 
very positive approaches taken in legislation with 
respect to the 20-year rules and the introduction of 
Land and Buildings Transaction Tax in April 2015 (the 
successor to Stamp Duty Land Tax). There also needs 
to be a clear commitment to ensure that the tax and 
regulatory environment does not negatively differentiate 
Scotland from the rest of the UK. The value of continued 
commitment to maintaining a predictable transparent 
regulatory environment cannot be overstated.
6.2   Developing a road map
In the next stage, the conditions and structures that will 
enable the recommendations to become fully effective 
need to be put in place. The road map of key steps and 
actions to be taken is as follows:
1.  Setting out the opportunities and aspirations and a 
broad plan, along with timeline, and putting in place the 
working party and Champion to take the plan forward
2.  Building the information base, including index, 
research and additional data, and developing a greater 
understanding of the marketplace at both national and 
local levels
3.  Writing the prospectus and the investment profile and 
building a sustained and targeted public relations 
process around them 
4.  Engaging with institutions and Scottish Financial 
Enterprise 
5.  Developing and launching demonstration PRS projects 
6.  Developing management standards in consultation with 
investors and managers
7.  Launching new schemes 
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Glossary and definitions
Acronyms
AHF Affordable Housing Finance plc
AST Assured Shorthold Tenancy (England)
GDV Gross development value
HA Housing association
IPD Investment Property Databank
LA Local authority
LBTT Land and Buildings Transactions Tax (Scotland, forthcoming)
LHA Local Housing Allowance
LLP Limited liability partnership
NHT National Housing Trust (Scotland)
OJEU Official Journal of the European Union
PRS Private rented sector
PWLB Public Works Loan Board
RP Registered Provider (England)
RSL Registered Social Landlord (Scotland0
S75 Section 75 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997
SAT Short Assured Tenancy (Scotland)
SDLT Stamp Duty Land Tax
SFE Scottish Financial Enterprise 
SFT Scottish Futures Trust
SPV Special purpose vehicle
SST Scottish Secure Tenancy
THFC The Housing Finance Corporation
Market rented 
housing 
Dwellings let at market-clearing rents, whether owned by private or registered social landlords 
through profit-making subsidiaries
Intermediate  
rented housing 
Dwellings let at sub-market but above social rent levels, usually provided with the help of public 
subsidy (which may be in the form of grant, loan, guarantee or waiver of receipts).
Social rented 
housing
Generally, social housing is rented housing provided by councils and registered social  
landlords, normally on a Scottish Secure Tenancy (SST).
The private  
rented sector
Dwellings that can be let at market rates. Traditionally defined by private nature of  
landlord, but these now include profit-making subsidiaries of social landlords.
The rented sector
Dwellings let by all types of landlord – local authorities, registered social landlords  
and private owners.
Glossary & definitions
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Annex A: The brief from Homes for Scotland
Background
The banking crisis and credit crunch of 2007/08 has 
resulted in a structural change in the ability, attitude and 
appetite of many banks to fund new housing development, 
to the point that many simply either cannot or do not wish 
to currently invest in the housebuilding/construction sector. 
The consequence of this change is that fewer homes, of all 
tenures, are able to be purchased or built.
In contrast, housing need is growing. National Records 
of Scotland forecast that, to meet population growth and 
household formation, 450,000 new homes are required 
between now and 2033. This equates to an average of 
22,500 new homes per year. In 2011, only 15,000 new 
homes were completed and the full year forecasts for 2012 
suggest little change on this total annual output.
The challenge, therefore, is how can we meet Scotland’s 
housing needs whilst access to traditional forms of 
finance and funding is constrained? Attracting large-
scale institutional investors into allocating funds for 
the development of new homes for rent is a major 
opportunity that would stimulate growth in the economy, 
the housebuilding sector and deliver a much needed 
boost to jobs in the construction sector and service 
industries.
 
The project Steering Group has now been formed and 
the next stage is to undertake the detailed analysis of the 
opportunity and commence with the design of possible 
solutions.
Aims & Objectives
3.1  Project Aim: “Supporting homebuilders to increase 
the supply of new homes in the rented sector in 
Scotland” 
3.2 Research Objectives: 
•	  To confirm and quantify our existing knowledge and 
understanding of the known barriers to this opportunity. 
Identify any new barriers.
•	  To identify, test and evaluate possible solutions and 
remedies to these barriers, with stakeholders
We specifically want to clarify and confirm our 
understanding of the perceived barriers and opportunities 
that exist to bring in new sources of finance or approaches 
that would leverage-in additional funding for the 
construction of new homes for rent. We are adopting a 
‘tenure-neutral’ approach to the project and are interested 
to investigate and consider all opportunities – social/
affordable, mid-market and private rented.
For the purposes of this project, we are assuming that 
conventional bank finance is excluded, given that this 
traditional source of funding is well-understood, both in 
terms of its process and limitations. Instead, we wish to 
understand more about new or potentially new sources of 
funding or financial models that could provide incremental 
increased net investment both in terms of their viability and 
potential enablers. 
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Category
Number of  
interviewees
In Scotland
Financial institutions, advisers and those working with financial models 4
Scottish Government policy makers and local officials 8
Existing large landlords 7
Developers and builders 10
Trade associations and academics 2
In London and elsewhere
Financial institutions, advisers and those working with financial models 8
UK and local government policy makers 6
Existing large landlords 4
Developers and builders 4
Think tanks, professional organisations and academics 7
TOTAL 60
Annex B: Interviewees: Categories and numbers
Annex B
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Annex C: The development of the private 
rented sector in Scotland: Historical context 
Pre-war
The heyday of institutional – or rather company – 
investment in private renting was before the Second 
World War (Hamnett and Randolph, 1988). The companies 
involved included large landowners, pension funds and 
property companies but also industrial and infrastructure 
firms that diversified into residential property or provided 
housing for their own staff (25% of the PRS in the early 
1970s was for employees, and that was mainly built before 
1939). Private renting was the majority tenure, so there was 
demand from employed households who had expectations 
of income growth but few other housing options. 
The 1930s changed this picture somewhat by increasing 
access to owner-occupation. Planning and policy were 
pro-development. There was very large-scale greenfield 
development, mainly ribbon and suburban housing where 
mixed tenure development was appropriate. In urban areas 
and especially in London the mansion block offered a 
simple, good quality product for investors. Rent controls put 
in place in 1915 (Englander, 1981) were being unwound and 
new investment in the sector was increasingly unaffected 
by these controls. There were large numbers of investors 
so it was easy to transact – although company investors 
generally kept their holdings into the long term. They 
managed the properties themselves or used specialist 
managers. The relevant alternative investments were 
direct investment in other sectors; property companies 
also invested in commercial. PRS was an apparently low-
risk investment with a clear and secure income stream; 
easy access to new projects; costs under control; and few 
alternatives for most tenants.
What changed? 
The Second World War led to the reintroduction of rent 
controls, which reduced returns to landlords, closed down 
their exit opportunities and made them less able to maintain 
the stock. This was followed by the demolition of large 
swathes of housing as a consequence of slum clearance 
and the municipalisation of parts of the remaining stock. 
The post-war growth of social housing and easier access to 
owner-occupation created wider housing opportunities for 
potential tenants. Subsequent deregulation and leasehold 
reform (and the reorganisation of residential portfolios by 
employers) opened up the possibility for landlords to exit 
by selling into owner-occupation; at the same time other 
investment opportunities increased. 
The result was a private rented market which mostly 
housed young and mobile households needing easy 
access to homes and those who had no other options 
(supported from the early 1970s by housing allowances). 
Almost all employer-owned housing was sold off (Hamnett 
and Randolph, 1988) and new build was concentrated in 
the owner-occupied market, meeting the requirements of 
lenders and government. There was little or no space for 
new private rented investment. Indeed the slow demise 
of the private rented sector was widely anticipated. 
Whitehead and Kleinman (1986) provided simple estimates 
in 1986 suggesting the sector would fall to 7% by 2000.
The creation of a new private rented market: initial steps
Student accommodation
The Business Expansion Scheme (BES), introduced in 
1988, provided tax incentives for individual investors in 
small companies to invest in rented accommodation. 
The scheme produced some 80,000 dwellings (Hughes, 
1995). It provided a clear exit strategy for individual 
investors.  In practice it was used mostly for student 
accommodation and other low-risk opportunities (including 
housing associations). It attracted large-scale build and 
management entrants into the student accommodation 
market, and there were some sales into institutional 
portfolios.  
The product was de-risked because universities acted 
as guarantors; because buildings and services were 
standardised; and because contracts provided a 
guaranteed income stream. Other initiatives involving the 
provision of mainstream privately rented accommodation 
were less long lasting; many of the companies were 
dissolved and the properties transferred to owner-
occupation. 
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Buy to let
The growth of the buy-to-let market from the mid-1990s 
came out of an initiative by the Association of Residential 
Letting Agents (ARLA) and supported by lenders. The aim 
was to offer an innovative mortgage product that would 
allow private investors to buy properties for renting out. 
This created welcome market diversity at the same time as 
other market factors led to increased demand. The market 
expanded rapidly and was supported by the shift in new 
build toward flats and higher density development. Buy-to-
let investors provided pre-sales which helped developer 
cash flow. The credit crunch of 2007/08 significantly 
reduced the supply of credit for buy-to-let mortgages but 
this is beginning to recover. At a UK level, buy to let now 
accounts for about 10% of gross mortgage lending and is  
at its highest level since mid-2008 (Paragon, 2013).
Buy-to-let investors want an investment they understand 
and which to some extent they can control. Most of them 
seek a total return including capital gains. To keep costs 
low, most (estimated at 55%, ibid) manage and maintain 
the properties themselves. The types of product required 
(either small blocks of flats or a normal owner-occupied 
product) are relatively easy for planners to accept and 
simple for developers to build. With debt finance and 
a well-defined exit strategy (generally sale into owner-
occupation), on a per-unit basis buy-to-let investors can 
outbid institutions and sometimes owner-occupiers.  
Accidental/reluctant landlords
The credit crisis and recession generated some accidental 
landlords who cannot or do not want to sell in the current 
environment although as the market has eased this 
group can be expected to shrink. An unknown proportion 
of the growth in the sector in Scotland from 6% at the 
turn of the century to 11% in 2010 (Scottish Government, 
2013) may be of this type, and the dwellings may transfer 
back to owner occupation if conditions change.  This, 
and the fact that such landlordism generates little if any 
additional investment, is a core reason for the emphasis on 
developing a more sustainable sector based on intentional 
landlords.  The Scottish Government estimates that only 2% 
of private rented housing in Scotland is held by institutional 
investors--i.e., little more than 5,000 units. 
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Annex D: Decision-making by owners and 
developers: financial modelling and risk
Much investment decision making is based on rule of 
thumb or intuition. However, the basis for any large scale 
involvement in the private rented sector by institutions must 
depend on formal financial modelling processes and the 
rates of return that can be actuarially compared to other 
opportunities. 
The term ‘financial model’ means different things in 
different contexts. The term can suggest something 
complex, opaque and possibly proprietary, and indeed 
in quantitative finance, models are sophisticated 
mathematical exercises that deal with portfolio returns, 
option pricing etc. But in the property sector financial 
models have tended to be relatively straightforward. At 
its most basic, a model could be a simple spreadsheet (or 
even a column of figures) which allows the user to make 
calculations based on a set of assumptions about costs and 
risk. The outputs or results from the model depend on what 
the user is trying to determine. Most property models are 
designed to calculate potential yield to the long term owner 
and therefore how much they will pay to purchase the 
properties, or residual land value to enable the developer 
to decide how much to pay for the land.
Most stakeholders in the field use versions of yield 
as a decision-making tool, but even among property 
professionals there is no single agreed approach to 
how yield should be calculated, and therefore about the 
precise meaning of the term. The most basic formulation 
is annual income /asset price which is then compared with 
yields elsewhere. In this simple form it would generate 
optimal decisions only if the investment asset were held 
in perpetuity, with constant certain rents and costs and 
perfect markets. In this case returns would be the same as 
for owner-occupation and the comparator is simply the risk-
free market interest rate. Not surprisingly, as decisions are 
actually being made in imperfect and uncertain worlds, the 
interpretation of yield depends on unspecified assumptions 
around future rents, costs and values as well as the 
individual organisation’s cost of capital, expected return 
and attitude to risk.
This income yield (also known as current or running 
yield) does not include capital gains. However many PRS 
investors (although probably not pension funds) expect 
that the bulk of the return will be in the form of capital 
appreciation. When capital gains are included, the total 
yield calculation is total return (income plus capital gains) 
over asset price. Confusingly, in property development 
circles the word ‘yield’ may be used to mean either 
income yield or total yield.  Another term used in property 
investment is the ‘all-risks yield’, meant to reflect all the 
risks involved in an investment.  Even in discussions among 
professionals it can be unclear which definition is being 
used – let alone what is determining the comparator rate.  
And many investors interpret ‘yield’ to mean the internal 
rate of return (IRR), which takes account more directly of all 
expected changes in revenues, costs and values as well as 
a more detailed understanding of the return on the relevant 
alternative investment.
Equally these narrow definitions of yield do not directly 
address issues of inflation and rising rents over time. This 
is important because investors, notably annuity funds, 
are looking for returns which rise with income. In this 
context many professionals would look to include regular 
adjustment of rents by CPI or RPI.  
To illustrate, we construct a simple model for yield 
accepting the assumptions of certainty, constant costs and 
revenues over time, perpetuity and neutrality between 
equity and debt financing. At this most basic level yield is 
a function of income (revenue less costs) and asset price. 
The equation can be stated two ways:
Yield = Income / asset price OR Asset price = income / yield
If we know income and asset price we can solve for yield 
and can compare it with other relevant opportunities; if 
the decision is about whether to bid for the property or 
land and we know income and apply a target yield, we can 
solve for the asset price that the decision maker would 
be prepared to pay. Whether that will be acceptable will 
depend on the alternatives available to the seller. 
There are several subsidiary variables and calculations that 
go into determining income even in this simple form. An 
example is set out in Table D1.  Revenue comes from rents, 
while costs include management and maintenance, voids 
and re-let costs as well as, for instance, ground rent.
Annex D
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Overall equation: Yield = Income / asset price OR Asset price = income / yield
Main elements Made up of Subsidiary elements/ calculations
Revenue
Annual rent  
*number of units 
Number of units 
Rent per unit
Annual rent increase
Costs
Voids 
Average tenant length of stay
Average time to find new tenant
Re-lets
Average cost of refurbishment between tenants 
Cost of marketing
Management
Property supervision, to include letting  
and running the property
Rent collection
Arrears and bad debts
Other costs
Repairs and maintenance
Insurance
Service charge and ground rents
Utilities
Table D1: Example of the elements determining income from an investment in PRS property
An investor would use a version of this to determine 
whether to invest in a hypothetical rented housing 
development. We assume here that this is a rental-only 
development that is fully let and that the revenue and cost 
streams are known. The investor’s target yield (which would 
depend on returns available from alternative investments 
with a similar risk profile) and the known income stream 
could be used to calculate an asset price. If the investor 
could purchase the asset for this price they would 
invest; if the price were higher they would not. This is a 
development valuation – a mirror of the residual valuation – 
just calculating for a different unknown.
Looking specifically at investment in new-build property, 
it is then necessary to determine whether the developer 
would be prepared to provide the dwellings. In this context 
developers use residual valuation calculations to determine 
what price they can pay for land, given assumptions about 
what can be built on that land. While the principles are the 
same, some of the assumptions differ between developers 
and institutions – so their calculations might not reach 
the same conclusions despite being based on similar 
information.  
The first stage of the development process is land 
purchase. A developer will expect to spend on land an 
amount equal to the final value of the development, less 
costs (including financing) and developer profit—this is 
known as the ‘residual land value’ method of pricing.  
1, Investment Property Databank (IPD) figures give an overall average cost 
of 34.3% of gross income for their sample of private rented properties 
(and 47.5% in Scotland and the North of England). Some of those we 
interviewed believed the gross-to-net difference could be reduced to 
perhaps 25% and even in some circumstances somewhat lower. However 
this would likely be possible only for certain types of units  
in concentrations big enough to ensure economies of scale.
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Overall equation: Residual land value = Gross development value – cost of production – developer profit
Main elements Made up of Subsidiary elements/calculations
Gross  
development  
value
Capitalised value of net 
rental income stream 
•	 Expected rents 
•	 Appropriate interest rate
Costs of production
Total construction cost
•	 Number of m2 of new build
•	 Going rate for construction
•	 	Cost of dealing with any site-specific problems  
(slope, contamination, etc.)
Associated land costs
•	  Local authority requirement for S75 contribution
•	 	Rights of light, etc.
Costs of first letting
•	 Expense	of	marketing,	fit-out	
•	 Time	required	to	achieve	full	occupancy
Fees
•	 Architects
•	 Surveyors
•	 Lawyers
Developer profit Required profit
The developer must therefore determine the final value of 
the development and the costs of producing it, given the 
required level of profit. The overall equation is:
Residual land value = Gross development value –  
cost of production – developer profit 
Again, each component of the equation is made up of 
subsidiary elements (even the developer profit may be 
part funding cost)—see Table D2. If the property is to be 
used for rental purposes, gross development value is the 
capitalised value of the rental income from the units. 
For the development to be used for renting this should 
equal the capital value that the highest bidder is prepared 
to pay. In many instances therefore the relevant valuation 
will be based on owner-occupation. In others a mix of 
tenures may give a higher value. Only if renting gives 
the highest expected value will this be the use to which 
the developer will put the land. (By implication many of 
the incentives necessary to ensure that land is available 
for rental provision must address the issue of different 
approaches to valuation.) 
See Table D2: below.
The costs of production include construction costs; 
associated land costs (including most importantly any S75 
contributions – see discussion on page 14); fees; and the 
cost of getting the development up to full occupancy on 
first letting. In the first instance we assume that planning 
permission is a given—that is, there is no risk or uncertainty 
about the possibility of developing the site. 
If we are solving for residual land value the final element is 
required developer profit, which is usually expressed as a 
percentage of gross development value (GDV). In principle 
it should be the best alternative use for the capital and 
expertise employed. However, many developers employ 
rules of thumb to calculate the margins they need to 
achieve, including their costs of capital, whether internal or 
from the market. The term ‘profit on cost’ refers to the profit 
on all costs including land; developers told us that their 
required profit on cost is about 20%.
2, Alternatively, if the price of the land is given, the equation can be 
restated to allow the developer to calculate potential profits: Developer 
profit = Gross development value – costs – price of land
 If the price is known it can be used instead of calculating net rents and 
an assumed interest rate. In a perfect world the calculation of gross 
development value would be equal to the asset price the purchaser is 
prepared to pay. In practice they will often differ.
Table D2: Elements determining land price for private rental development (no planning risk)
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Complexities: risk 
The preceding calculations are simplifications because they 
do not take account of risk and uncertainty. Adding these 
elements does not change the fundamental principles 
but makes the models more realistic and more subject 
to variation in values. Decision makers will all take these 
elements into account when making their choices although 
rarely in a fully transparent fashion. At its simplest they 
wrap up all the risks they perceive in the yield requirement, 
which is in principle based on returns on comparably risky 
investments. 
Discussions of the barriers to investment in rented housing 
often focus on the question of risk. But this risk is not 
monolithic; there are a number of discrete risks, which 
appear at different points of the development process. 
The types of risk to which investors are exposed (as well 
as the potential returns) depend particularly on the timing 
of the investment and the terms of their agreement with 
the developer, and also on their investment model—as 
some will only buy completed and let units. Table 3 sets 
out a timeline of risks during the development and transfer 
process, and indicates how the basic investor/developer 
models could be modified to deal with these risks.
Blanket terms Stages in development process Associated risk
How calculations could 
reflect
Planning risk
Purchase site Site may have unforeseen 
problems (contamination, 
archaeological remains)
Add X% (say 15-20%) for land 
and planning risk to required 
returns to developers
Secure planning permission Planning permission may not 
be granted for requested 
scheme. Modifications may 
be required with associated 
costs or improved revenues. 
S75requirements may be 
different than anticipated.  
Time taken to secure 
permission may be longer than 
expected.
Development 
risk
Build Construction costs may be 
higher than expected. Delay.
Possibly add 5% for 
construction risk although 
sometimes just accepted
Initial letting Units may take longer to let 
than anticipated 
Rents may need to be cut
Marketing costs may rise 
Little experience on which to 
base estimate 
Operating or 
management 
risk
Operation after full letting Void risk. Non-payment of 
rent and consequent costs of 
eviction. Costs rise faster than 
rents. 
Add x% for operational risk 
to investor model OR require 
rent guarantee from AA 
counterparty
Table D3: Risk timeline for PRS development
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The main types of risk are discussed below, in the order in 
which they appear in the development process. 
Planning risk
The developer calculations summarised in Table D2 
assume that planning permission is guaranteed—they 
do not incorporate planning risk. But a developer buying 
land without planning permission must explicitly factor 
this in. First, the developer needs to account for the costs 
involved in securing planning permission—both in terms 
of expert advice but also time and the capital that is tied 
up. More importantly, the developer’s required profit will 
be adjusted up to reflect the risk that planning permission 
will not be secured for the desired development (or will 
not be secured at all). A developer who would look for a 
20% profit on cost on a development without planning risk 
might seek twice as much—say 40% profit on cost—on a 
site where planning permission was required, even though 
the risk is borne for a relatively short time and there may 
be means of mitigating it.  Additional costs include expert 
fees and delays as well as variations on numbers of units, 
costs per unit, planning obligations and other factors. It 
should however be remembered that there are sometimes 
opportunities of super profit if permission is more generous 
than expected or a phased approach allows a better 
understanding of possibilities. 
Development risk
Development risk includes construction risk, which is 
associated with changes to the specification, delays 
and other unexpected issues such as access to the site 
and contamination (or even finding protected species). 
Interviewees regarded these as well understood. They 
probably account for some 5% of estimated costs or are 
sometimes simply accepted. Developers normally do site 
surveys to assess ‘abnormal costs’, which can be passed 
onto the landowner.
We have also included initial lettings risk in this category 
although there is always the possibility of transfer at 
completion with the investor taking on the first letting risk. 
Institutional investors would normally not take this risk 
directly. This risk includes whether the tenants are those 
expected; whether there is a good pipeline of potential 
tenants; how the social housing element is filled; how much 
the marketing costs; and how much initial lettings impact on 
longer term costs and revenues.  This initial letting risk was 
highlighted in a number of interviews, in part because there 
is relatively little experience to go on.
Management or operating risk
This is the main long-term income risk for owners and 
investors, and affects the difference between the gross rent 
and the net rent. The level of risk depends on how rents 
develop (whether they increase in line with incomes; the 
impact of any changes to rent control and housing benefit, 
etc.); the form of contact between the investor and the 
property manager; the quality of the building; the tenants’ 
treatment of the property; and the manager’s efficiency and 
skill. To some extent these risks can be reduced if the initial 
specification is correct, especially if the eventual manager 
was involved at an early stage. 
More general risks
Table D4 covers more general risks, which do not usually 
enter formally into developer or investor calculations even 
though investors in particular raised concerns because 
of their longer term involvement. It also gives some 
assessment of the degree to which important market actors 
are willing to bear these risks.
Exit risks are to do with whether the exit strategy can 
actually be carried out at the expected price. So for 
instance for a buy-to-let investor, exit risk depends on 
how capital values and tax requirements are expected 
to develop, and over what time period. For longer-term 
investors the risks are more about whether there will be a 
market among investors (which is obviously very thin at the 
moment) and the costs of transfer into owner-occupation if 
this proves to be the best available option at some stage. 
A number of models incorporate onwards sale for £1 at the 
end of the investment period; the return is taken up front.
Reputational risk is mainly about what happens if a tenancy 
goes wrong; whether management is effective; or there 
is bad publicity around the PRS more generally. Most 
institutional investors want an income stream like bonds 
provide, with none of the hassle of dealing with tenants or 
managers, but in the past private renting has been seen as 
a difficult residual sector with many associated problems. 
The aim of most investors is to separate the high quality 
investment units from the more general product, and for 
this reason some investors would support well organised 
regulation as long as it did not affect rental streams. Some 
are concerned about their good name across their whole 
portfolio so put a very high ‘price’ on these risks. 
Regulatory and policy risks: traditionally the concern has 
been around the potential re-introduction of rent controls 
and increased security of tenure. Although the current 
Scottish Government have made clear their interest in 
supporting investment in the PRS this continues to be 
seen by some stakeholders a significant risk. Moreover, 
historically there have been sudden changes of policy 
(often after elections), so many market actors are risk 
averse. The more general problem of policy risk lies 
around the possibility of unexpected initiatives; of crowding 
out—e.g. via Help to Buy—or tax changes that affect returns 
and sales.
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In general long-term institutional investors seek low-
risk, relatively certain investments, and in exchange 
are willing to forego potential high returns. They show 
little enthusiasm for funding developments that do not 
have planning permission, and look for a stable policy 
environment and a known exit strategy. 
Complexities: Finance
The simplified investor and developer calculations 
presented earlier in this section do not take account of 
the realities of financing. In practice, developments are 
typically funded several times, as more expensive sources 
of funding (which are the only ones available at high-risk 
stages of the project) are replaced by cheaper funding 
when risks diminish. Table D5 sets out funding stages for 
our notional speculative PRS-only development. The first 
stage, which involves the most risk, will only be financed by 
funders willing to accept high risk in return for the potential 
of high returns; these may include private equity firms that 
accept they may lose significant amounts but in exchange 
take a high proportion of uplift. In the past banks would 
have been a source of funds at this stage but are currently 
very wary.
Once planning permission is secured planning risk 
(which covers a range of costs not just whether planning 
permission will be granted so simply buying subject to 
planning permission does not fully address) no longer an 
issue, the developer can refinance out the original deal 
to get cheaper finance. Banks are willing to lend at this 
stage, but will generally only cover about 50% of the cost 
of development and are often looking for pre-sales. The 
rest comes from the developer’s internal sources or more 
expensive external debt finance. Some institutions will 
contract to the final income at this stage, which unlocks 
cheaper finance. 
Exit risk Reputational risk Regulatory/policy risk
Long-term institutional 
investors generally willing  
to bear?
Need clear strategy  
to mitigate
Remains a big concern Want certainty
Non-institutional  
professional investors  
willing to bear?
Need capacity to  
sell at will
Remains a concern Want certainty
Developers willing to bear? Some want to be able to trade Not bothered
Unworried if able to exit 
through sale
Housing associations  
willing to bear?
Some
Yes--believe they can 
mitigate
Have no choice
Table D4: More general risks 
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Conclusion
The main objective of this section is to clarify that simple 
investment rules – like a required yield of X% – actually 
hide the far more detailed assessment of revenues, costs, 
financing and particularly risk that developers and investors 
undertake. 
Absolutely central to the capacity to estimate risk-adjusted 
returns is an evidence base in relation to each of the 
elements described above. In practice there are many rules 
of thumb used by developers and institutions alike and 
someone (or some committee) has to take a view of the 
overall risk/return balance. Financial calculations help that 
process, but can only provide evidence of potential returns 
as a baseline for these more general decisions—and like 
all mathematical expressions are only as good as the data 
they are based on. 
Perhaps the most important implication is that early 
investors will probably be those who have individual 
reasons for taking on a new activity in the residential 
context. This almost inherently implies that they see some 
potential for super-profits. Later entrants will have the 
evidence of past experience of success and failure so that 
investment becomes a less risky and more mainstream 
decision. 
Stages in development 
process Average length of stage Sources of finance Cost of funds
Purchase site;
Secure planning
12-24 months; occasionally 
much longer
Private equity 
Short-term bank loan
Developer’s equity 
High because of  
planning risk.
Private equity may take 
a large proportion of 
planning gain
Build
Initial letting
12-18 months
Developer equity
Bank loan
Say 5% on 50% of cost, 
once development risk 
addressed
Operation after  
full letting
Long term
Institutional investors
Bonds
(Banks have generally 
withdrawn from this  
market)
For de-risked  
investment (with 
guarantee or leased 
by AA counterparty) 
institutions require 
income yield of  
say 4-5%
Table D5: Financing timeline for development : traditional pattern
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Annex E: Examples of existing financial models 
to channel investment into rented housing 
Examples of direct purchase models
Resolution Foundation
The Resolution Foundation is a London-based think tank 
that specialises in research into the problems affecting 
middle-income families in the UK. In October 2013 it 
published the description of a rental-housing investment 
scheme that would channel institutional funds into a 
number of housing developments across the UK. These 
developments, all in the planning or construction stage, 
are owned by housing associations. Institutions would 
purchase a majority share in a portfolio of units from the 
associations, which would retain a small equity stake. The 
institutions would receive a rental income stream from the 
investments and contract with the housing associations to 
manage them. 
The Resolution Foundation’s calculations suggest that 
depending on the exact portfolios chosen, investors could 
expect an income yield of between 3.9% and 4.7%, and 
IRRs including capital growth of 6.5-7.2%. Returns would be 
higher if the investment were concentrated in high-demand 
areas rather than spatially spread.
As set out the model does not lead to any new housing 
provision, as it is based on actual sites that already have 
planning permission. Rather it is intended a demonstration 
exercise to show that this type of investment could work in 
principle.
Halcyon
Halcyon City Living is a recently formed company that 
is hoping to develop market-rent housing in Scotland. It 
focuses on larger development sites in prime or good 
locations in major cities. The intention is to sell the housing 
to investors when it is fully let and income is stabilised. The 
firm reports that major investors are interested, but will 
require a government guarantee of the rental stream or 
shortfall, at least initially until the concept is proven.
Bond models
Carduus
Carduus is a Scottish bond aggregator, formed in 2012 
to provide low-cost, long-term finance to RSLs. Its first 
bond will be launched in late 2013/early 2014 (no firm 
date announced), allowing participating Scottish housing 
associations to access funding at historically low rates. 
Each association can commit to any level of borrowing 
from £1m upwards. The funding must be drawn down 
immediately and will be repaid in amortized payments 
over 30 years. About 15 housing associations have pre-
qualified, though it is not yet known precisely how many 
will participate in the first bond issue. The only other 
aggregator currently operating in this market is The 
Housing Finance Corporation. 
Participating associations can use the funding for any 
purpose, including new construction for social, mid-market 
or private rent, or refurbishment. Not all the funds will be 
available for these uses, though, as a significant proportion 
will go to refinancing the associations’ existing obligations 
to banks—many of which are trying to re-price their loans 
to housing associations and even withdraw from this 
market. Carduus takes a charge on some of the borrower’s 
unencumbered property, so the loan is secured on the 
financial performance of that stock. These assets are 
valued on a discounted cash flow basis in existing use. 
Carduus expects the bond to be placed with a small 
number of institutional investors; it is ideal for annuity 
funds as it matches the profile of their outgoings. HSBC will 
manage bids from a suite of interested investors. 
Lease models
Bellerophon 
Bellerophon, founded about two years ago, is a limited 
partnership headquartered in Cardiff and with offices in 
Scotland. It works with a major annuity provider to fund 
affordable and market rented units. They act as both broker 
and aggregator, channelling investment from the institution 
to fund construction of new housing. This housing is owned 
by a joint-venture LLP and leased to the local authority for 
a fixed period with a purchase option for the local authority 
or RSL.
Annex E
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The organisation is a private firm but has partly charitable 
goals. They aim to build affordable housing that rents 
at 65-100% of LHA. The organisation that operates the 
housing stock (usually a local authority) agrees to lease it 
and manage it; this is a straight lease, not a rent guarantee. 
The local authority in turn may allow housing associations 
to operate the units. Bellerophon aggregates the 
developments to achieve transaction sizes that will match 
institutional needs (£10 million and up).
The investment value of these schemes is generally not 
much more than the build cost, so there is little immediate 
profit; Bellerophon typically defers its profit for 10 to 20 
years, then exits. Bellerophon say the scheme requires 
little or no grant due to the combination of deferred profit, 
competitive build prices and low long-term finance charges. 
Because the scheme is based on the participation of local 
authorities it will usually require a local authority or RSL 
participant to go through European Union procurement 
procedures. 
In Wales Bellerophon won a £1 billion procurement 
challenge hosted by the Welsh public sector, RSLs and 
local authorities, and their first scheme will start in January 
with about 200 units.
M&G
M&G, part of the Prudential Group, is one of the pioneers of 
institutional investment in rented housing. One of the two 
schemes it has invested in so far is located in London at 
Aberfeldy New Village at East India Dock. M&G bought the 
land from a housing association, and has contracted with 
a large developer to provide both affordable and market 
rent units. M&G will fund the construction, and when it 
is completed the housing association will take a 30-year 
lease on the whole scheme (both affordable and market 
housing) from M&G. Lease payments for the affordable/
social and market units are calculated separately, and the 
association has the option to purchase the affordable and 
social units for £1 after 30 years. 
M&G is paying the developer in agreed stages, with a 
large final payment. This provides collateralisation—if the 
developer fails it will allow M&G to get someone else to 
finish the project—which reduces development risk. M&G 
did not commit to funding until after planning permission 
was secured.
The investor (underlying investors are generally UK 
pension funds) gets cash flow (usually inflation linked) and 
a potential capital upside with their exposure to London 
residential. 
The housing association gets access to additional stock 
without taking development risk for new build (or can 
release a large chunk of capital tied up in the PRS for 
existing developments, which they can use to invest in 
their core mission) through the £1 end-of-lease purchase 
option for the affordable housing. They maintain control 
of the entire development and the size gives them 
significant economies of scale, which allows them to push 
down the gross-to-net difference and enhance the profit 
rent component between net income and the underlying 
lease payment to the investor. The association takes on 
management risk, voids and the risk of bad tenants. 
The viability of this approach depends on having a strong 
credit-rated counterparty who can take on that risk—either 
a local authority or an RSL. The developer gets access to 
a complete financing and pre-committed sale solution at 
competitive pricing, subject to final planning approvals and 
a lease pre-commitment from the RSL or local authority. 
Models that harness borrowing capacity of local 
authorities 
Resonance
This scheme was developed by Rettie & Co., a Scottish 
estate agent and property advisor.  It seeks to use mid-term 
(+/-10 year) funding at quantitative-easing rates of interest 
to stimulate the construction and subsequent rental or sale 
of the finished properties at affordable rates.  By borrowing 
at government (PWLB) rates or by private funders, low-
interest funds are secured to provide what is in effect a 
10-year interest-only mortgage secured on the finished 
value of a residential construction project.  This ‘mortgage’, 
or refinancing, is limited by the capacity of the net rents to 
service the interest rate charged and by a prudent loan-
to-value ratio. The lower the interest rate charged, the 
lower the rents that can be safely sustained (reducing void 
rates) or the higher the quality/cost of construction. The 
assumption is that the principal of the loan will be repaid 
out of sales over a 10-year period.
The refinancing is intended to cover the construction costs 
and contractors’ margin on a project. The intention is that 
the underlying land value is treated as an equity investment 
which remains at risk until the refinancing is repaid. The 
refinancing is agreed before construction starts, and as 
a result banks will offer a short-term construction loans, 
allowing contractors to tender or SME developers to get 
building. Only the refinancing debt is guaranteed; there is 
no guarantee of return to the equity or of rental income. 
Equity is still reliant on successful rent profiles and eventual 
sales receipts for its return – i.e. it is taking a full market 
risk, whether on occupancy demand (rents) or sale demand. 
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A key characteristic of the Resonance model is that the 
units covered by any S75 agreement (usually 25% of the 
total) are also built, but are not sold and remain rented 
at affordable rents in perpetuity. The title to these units 
is transferred to the public sector, together with the pro-
rata refinancing obligation on them. Equity therefore has 
to achieve its return from sales of the 75% of units not 
covered by the S75. In effect, the embedded equity value 
of the S75 units (the difference between their open-market 
sales value and the value of the refinancing obligation) 
passes to the affordable sector in exchange for access to 
inexpensive 10-year funding. The arrangement of a loan is 
not the purchase of goods or services, and as such should 
not be subject to EU procurement regulations.
The model could offer attractive returns for institutional 
investors. We were told that the net net IRR profiles 
on deals done to date were between 9% and 14%, and 
investors can take either the equity exposure over a 10-
year period, purchase the debt (in effect a gilt) or acquire a 
blend of both.
National Housing Trust initiative (NHT)
The Scottish Government, with support from the Scottish 
Futures Trust (SFT), developed the original NHT model 
for councils and developers. This model leverages in 
private sector funding and council borrowing to support 
the delivery of homes for intermediate (mid-market) rent. 
Developers build the homes to agreed standards and 
timescales. Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs) composed 
of the council, the developer and SFT are set up to oversee 
progress on each developer’s site within a council area. 
Once complete, the homes are purchased by the relevant 
LLP. The LLP pays between 65% and 70% of an agreed 
purchase price to the developer upfront. This contribution 
is funded by participating councils, who provide loans to 
the LLPs in their area; the Scottish Government provides 
participating councils with a guarantee that it will cover 
capital and interest payments if the LLP is unable to pay the 
council. The remaining 30% to 35% of the purchase price is 
contributed by the developer as a mixture of loan funding 
and equity investment.
 
Homes are expected to be available to tenants for five to 
ten years. The developer can trigger the sale of the homes 
between years six and ten, with tenants given the first 
option to buy. Sales proceeds are used first to repay the 
council’s loan to the LLP, and then to reimburse any calls on 
the Scottish Government guarantee, before the developer 
receives repayment of loan funding and any repayment of 
equity capital (up to a capped level). To date, 10 councils 
have secured deals with 13 developers to deliver over 
1,000 homes through this model at various locations across 
the country. 
The ‘NHT council variant’ supplements the original model. 
It follows the same basic principles but places the council 
at the heart of a partnership set up to own, manage and 
maintain the homes. Members of the partnership (in the 
form of an LLP) include SFT and the council. 
The NHT council variant has only one LLP per council 
area, and is supported by a capped Scottish Government 
revenue-only guarantee to councils. Councils can propose 
either new-build or existing homes for LLP acquisition. Any 
homes purchased must be available for rent for between 
five and ten years; after that the council is free to use the 
dwellings or sell them as it wishes. To date 175 homes 
have been approved through this route, with more in the 
pipeline.
The NHT initiative includes a version designed specifically 
for Registered Social Landlords (RSLs). This was launched 
in 2012 and bids were received to deliver several hundred 
homes across Scotland. The total cost of the homes in this 
variant is made up of two parts: (a) RSL debt that the net 
free rental income repays and (b) equity invested by an 
RSL (which could come from land or other resources).The 
Scottish Government offers an NHT guarantee to RSLs to 
support the debt finance raised for a maximum period of 10 
years, building upon the principles of the original model. No 
partnership vehicle is needed. Homes can be new build or 
created through the conversion of non-residential property, 
and can be developed directly by RSLs or procured from 
private developers. 
Homes must be affordable to households on low to 
moderate incomes, and must be made available for let to 
target tenant groups at an intermediate (mid-market) rent 
for a minimum of five years. If an RSL wishes, it can begin 
to sell the homes after the initial five-year letting period. 
There is flexibility on exit to enable RSLs to retain homes 
indefinitely.
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